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Abstract
Many decision problems on security protocols can be reduced to solving
so-called intruder constraints in Dolev Yao model. Most constraint solving
procedures for protocol security rely on two properties of constraint systems
called monotonicity and variable-origination. In this work we relax these
restrictions by giving a decision procedure for solving general intruder con-
straints (that do not have these properties) that stays in NP. Our result
extends a first work by L. Mazare´ in several directions: we allow non-atomic
keys, and an associative, commutative and idempotent symbol (for modeling
sets). We also discuss several new applications of the results.
Keywords: ACI, deducibility constraints, Dolev-Yao deduction system,
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1. Introduction
Detecting flaws in security protocol specifications under the perfect cryp-
tography assumption in Dolev-Yao intruder model is an approach that has
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been extensively investigated in recent years [1, 2, 3, 4]. In particular symbolic
constraint solving has proved to be a very successful approach in the area. It
amounts to express the possibility of mounting an attack, e.g. the derivation
of a secret, as a list of steps where for each step some message has to be
derived from the current intruder knowledge. These steps correspond in
general to the progression of the protocol execution, up to the last one which
is the secret derivation.
Enriching standard Dolev-Yao intruder model with different equational
theories [5, 6] like exclusive OR, modular exponentiation, Abelian groups, etc.
[7, 8, 9] helps to find flaws that could not be detected considering free symbols
only. A particularly useful theory is the theory of an ACI operator (that is
associative commutative and idempotent) since it allows one to express sets
in cryptographic protocols.
Up to one exception [10, 11], all proposed algorithms rely on two strong
assumptions about the constraints to be processed: knowledge monotonicity
and variable origination. Constraints satisfying this hypothesis are called
well-formed constraints in the literature and they are not restrictive as these
conditions hold when handling standard security problems with a single Dolev-
Yao intruder. However, we will see that in some situations it can be quite useful
to relax these hypotheses and consider general constraints, that is constraints
without the restrictions above. General constraints naturally occur when
considering security problems involving several non-communicating Dolev-
Yao intruders (see § 2.1). Remark that if intruders can communicate during
protocol execution, the model becomes attack-equivalent to one with a unique
Dolev-Yao intruder [12].
1.1. Contributions of the paper
First, we will show that as for the standard case, in this more general
framework it is still possible to derive an NP decision procedure for detecting
attacks on a bounded number of protocol sessions (Sections 5, 4). Second,
our result extends previous ones by allowing non-atomic keys and the usage
of an associative commutative idempotent operator (Sections 3, 4) that can
be used for instance to model sets of nodes in XML document (see § 2.2).
Third, we will remark that the satisfiability procedure we obtain for general
constraints is a non trivial extension of the one for well-formed constraints
by showing that this procedure cannot be extended to handle operators with
subterm convergent theories since satisfiability gets undecidable in this case
(Appendix A). On the other hand it is known that satisfiability remains
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decidable for the standard case of well-formed constraints with the same
operator properties [13]. Finally we will sketch the potential applications of
our results (Section 2).
1.2. Related works
The decision procedure for satisfiability of well-formed constraint systems
can be used to decide the insecurity of cryptographic protocols with a bounded
number of sessions [14]. In this domain, several works deviated from the
perfect cryptography assumption and started to consider algebraic properties
of functional symbols. For example properties of XOR operator and expo-
nentiation were considered in [15, 8, 16, 17] and together with homomorphic
symbol in [18]. Some algebraic properties (like associative and commutative
symbol) make the insecurity problem undecidable [19].
All the works mentioned above consider systems of constraints with two
restrictions namely knowledge monotonicity (the left-hand side of a constraint
representing the current knowledge of the intruder is included into the left-
hand side of the next one) and variable origination (variable appears first in
the right-hand side of some constraint): this limitation is not impeding the
solution of usual protocol insecurity problems since the constraints generated
with an active Dolev-Yao intruder are of the required type. An attempt to
swerve from well-formed constraints was made by Mazare´ [10]. He considered
“quasi well-formed” constraint systems by partially relaxing the knowledge
monotonicity. Later, in his thesis [11], he raised a similar decidability problem,
but now for general constraint systems. He succeeded to find a decision
procedure for satisfiability of general constraint systems with the restriction
that keys used for encryption are atomic. However to our knowledge no
extension of Dolev-Yao deduction system to non-atomic key or to algebraic
properties has been shown decidable for general constraint systems. Moreover,
satisfiability of well-formed constraints with ACI theory was not considered
before.
2. Motivating examples
2.1. Protocol analysis with several intruders
In the domain of security protocol analysis Dolev-Yao model is widely
used in spite of its limitations. We propose here to consider instead of a
powerful Dolev-Yao intruder that controls the whole network, several non
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Figure 1: Untrusted routers
communicating Dolev-Yao intruders with smaller controlled domains. We
give below an application of this model.
Suppose several agents (A,B . . . , see Figure 1) execute a message exchange
protocol (every agent has a finite list of actions in a send/receive format that
is known to everybody). Due to their (long distance) layout they have to
transmit data through routers (1, 2, 3 . . . ). The routing tables of all honest
routers/agents are static (messages follow always the same path). Some
routers (2, 5, 7) may be compromised: an intruder managed to install a
device controlling input and output of the router or implanted there his
malicious code. A message circulated via such an untrusted channel (e.g.
DB) is consumed by the corresponding compromised device (local intruder)
(7) thereby increasing his knowledge. Moreover, a local intruder can forge
and emit to an endpoint (C,B,D) of any channel he controls (BD,DB,DC)
any message he can build using the content of his memory and some available
transformations specified by a deduction system. Because of the network
topology malicious routers have no means to communicate (there is no links
between them, neither direct nor via other routers), but at some point
the intruder can gather the knowledge of all the compromised routers (by
physically collecting devices or reading their memory).
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In this framework the security problem is to know whether it is possible
to initially give instructions to compromised routers (e.g. by reprogramming
malicious devices) to force such an execution that honest agents (that strictly
follow their list of actions) will reveal some secret data to the intruder (i.e.
intruder can build this data from the gathered at the end knowledge of all
local intruders).
2.1.1. Formalizing the coordinated attack problem
To formalize the problem we introduce some notations and definitions
that are more detailed in Subsection 3.1.
Messages. We consider first-order terms built from a set of function sym-
bols (such as encryption, pairing, etc.), a set of constants A (representing
elementary pieces of data: texts, public keys, names of agents, etc. also called
atoms) and a set of variables X . Let T be the set of all possible terms. For a
term t we write Vars (t) the set of all variables in t (see Def. 3.9). A term t is
a ground term, if Vars (t) = ∅. The set of ground terms is denoted by Tg. We
assume that terms are interpreted modulo an equational theory and that we
can compute for every term t a unique normal form denoted by ptq modulo
this equational theory. (We will focus later on the special case where we
have a function symbol · and the theory is generated by the commutativity,
associativity and idempotency of·). A term t is normalized if t = ptq. Two
terms p and q are equivalent, if ppq = pqq. Given a set of terms T we define
pTq = {ptq : t ∈ T}. More details are given in Section 3.
We define a substitution σ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} (where xi ∈ X and
ti ∈ T ) to be the mapping σ : T → T , such that tσ is a term obtained by
replacing, for all i, each occurrence of variable xi by the corresponding term
ti. The set of variables {x1, . . . , xk} is called the domain of σ and denoted by
dom (σ). If T ⊆ T , then by definition Tσ = {tσ : t ∈ T}. A substitution σ is
ground if for any i ∈ {1, . . . , k}, ti is ground. We will say that the substitution
σ is normalized, if for all x ∈ dom (σ), xσ is normalized.
Agents. We will call communicating parties agents. Every agent is identified
by its name. We denote a set of agent names as A.
Channels. Any two agents a and b communicate through a channel denoted
as a ⇀ b. We will suppose, that channels are directed. The set of all channels
is denoted as C. A channel supports a queue of messages: for example, if
a sends sequentially two messages to b (via channel a ⇀ b), then b cannot
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process the second message before the first one; the sent messages are stored
in queue to be processed in order of arrival.
Agents behavior. We define a protocol session PS = {〈ai, li〉}i=1,...,k as a finite
set of pairs of an agent name and a finite list of actions to be executed by this
agent1. We also suppose that Vars (li) ∩ Vars (lj) = ∅, for all i 6= j (where
Vars (·) is naturally extended on lists of actions).
Every action is of receiving type ?fr or sending type !ts, where
• f is an agent name, whom a message is to be received from;
• r is a term (a template for the message) expected to be received from f ;
• t is an agent name, whom the message is expected to be sent to;
• s is a term (a template for the message) to be sent to t.
Let us consider any agent a ∈ A participating in the protocol session PS
and let
〈
a, {ρi}i=1,...,k
〉
∈ PS.
Case 1. If ρ1 =?f1r1 then the first action agent a can do, is to accept a
message m, admittedly from agent f1 on channel f1 ⇀ a, matching the pattern
r1, i.e. such that pr1σq = pmq for some substitution σ. Agent is blocked
(does not execute any other actions) by awaiting a message. If a receives a
message that does not match the expected pattern, then a terminates his
participation in PS. Note that no notification is sent to the sender, thus a
sender continues his execution2. Once a has received message m matching the
pattern r1 with substitution σ, he instantiate Vars (r1) with σ and execute
his remaining actions using these values, i.e. a moves to a state where the
list of actions to be executed is {ρiσ}i=2,...,k, with
ρσ =
{
?f (rσ), if ρ =?fr;
!t(sσ), if ρ =!ts.
1For simplicity, we suppose that for a protocol session, one agent cannot have more
than one list of actions to execute, but this restriction can be relaxed.
2A way to model another behavior, is to explicitly provide for every sending a succedent
receive of an acknowledge message and for every receive a succedent send of an acknowledge
message.
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We will say that an action ρ is ground, if ρ =?fr and r is a ground term; or
ρ =!ts and s is ground.
Case 2. If ρ1 is !t1s1 then the first action of agent a is sending message s1
to agent t1 (i.e. putting it to channel a ⇀ t1) and then, moving to a state
where {ρi}i=2,...,k has to be executed.
We suppose that agents cannot have a sending pattern that contains
variables not instantiated before, i.e. for any 〈a, ρ1. · · · .ρka〉 ∈ PS if ρi =!ts
then for any variable x ∈ Vars (s) there exists j < i such that ρj =?fr and
x ∈ Vars (r).
Intruder model. We assume that some communication channels are controlled
by N local intruders {Ii}i=1,...,N and there is no channel controlled by more
than one intruders. We introduce an intruders layout represented by a
function ι : C 7→ I ∪ {∅} mapping every channel to the local intruder that
controls it if there is one, to ∅ otherwise.
Every intruder I is given some initial knowledge K0I that is a set of ground
terms. Once an agent sends a message via a channel controlled by intruder,
the intruder reads it and blocks it. Reading the message means extending
intruder’s current knowledge with this message. An intruder controlling a
channel can generate a message from his knowledge using deduction rules and
send it to its endpoint.
We now specify the intruder capabilities:
Definition 2.1. A rule is a tuple of terms written as s1, . . . , sk → s, where
s1, . . . , sk, s are terms. A deduction system D is a set of rules.
From now to the end of this section rules are assumed to belong to a fixed
deduction system D.
Definition 2.2. A ground instance of a rule d = s1, . . . , sk → s is a rule
l = l1, . . . , lk → r where l1, . . . , lk, r are ground terms and there exists σ —
ground substitution, such that li = siσ, for i = 1, . . . , k and r = sσ. We call
a ground instance of a rule a ground rule.
Given two sets of ground terms E, F and a rule l→ r, we write E →l→r F
iff F = E ∪ {r} and l ⊆ E, where l is a set of terms. We write E → F iff
there exists rule l→ r such that E →l→r F .
Definition 2.3. A derivation D of length n ≥ 0 is a sequence of finite sets
of ground terms E0, E1, . . . , En such that E0 → E1 → · · · → En, where
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Ei = Ei−1 ∪ {ti} ,∀i = {1, . . . , n}. A term t is derivable from a set of terms
E iff there exists a derivation D = E0, . . . , En such that E0 = E and t ∈ En.
A set of terms T is derivable from E, iff every t ∈ T is derivable from E. We
denote Der (E) set of terms derivable from E.
Local intruder I can send a message m, if m ∈ Der (KI), where KI is a
current knowledge of intruder I.
Protocol session execution. Now,we can present a course of a protocol execu-
tion. We first introduce a notion of symbolic execution, where data exchanged
among the agents and intruders are not instantiated and represented as (pos-
sibly non-ground) terms. This execution is constrained by some conditions.
Whenever these conditions are satisfied by an appropriate ground instanti-
ation of variables, we obtain a concrete execution, or simply an execution.
These conditions are defined by constraint systems :
Definition 2.4. Let E be a set of terms and t be a term, we define the couple
(E, t) denoted E B t to be a constraint. A constraint system is a set
S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
where n is an integer and Ei B ti is a constraint for i ∈ {1, . . . , n}.
We extend the definition of Vars (·) to constraint system S in a natural
way. We say that S is normalized, if every term in S is normalized. By pSq
we will denote a constraint system {pEiq B ptiq}i=1,...,n.
Definition 2.5. A ground substitution σ is a model of constraint E B t (or
σ satisfies this constraint), if ptσq ∈ Der (pEσq). A ground substitution σ is
a model of a constraint system S, if it satisfies all the constraints of S and
dom (σ) = Vars (S).
Definition 2.6. A configuration Π of a protocol session is a quadruple
〈PS,K,Q,S〉, where K = {〈Ii, Ki〉}i=1,...,N represents current knowledges of
intruders, and Q = {〈c,mc〉}c∈C is a configuration of channels: for every
channel c queue of messages mc is given.
Transitions on configurations are defined in Table3 1 and will be explained
later. Transitions are written in form Π1
cond−−→ Π2 and state that configuration
Π1 can evolve to a new configuration Π2 if condition cond is satisfied.
3unionmulti represents the union of two disjoint sets: A unionmultiB = A ∪B iff A ∩B = ∅.
8
1. 〈{〈a, (?fr).la〉} unionmulti PS, {〈I,K〉} unionmulti K,Q,S〉 ι(f⇀a)=I−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS, {〈I,K〉} ∪ K,Q,S ∪ {K B r}〉
2. 〈{〈a, (!ts).la〉} unionmulti PS, {〈I,K〉} unionmulti K,Q,S〉 ι(a⇀t)=I−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS, {〈I,K ∪ s〉} ∪ K,Q,S〉
3. 〈{〈a, (!ts).la〉} unionmulti PS,K, {〈a ⇀ t,ma⇀t〉} unionmulti Q,S〉 ι(a⇀t)=∅−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈a ⇀ t,ma⇀t.s〉} ∪ Q,S〉
4. 〈{〈a, (?fr).la〉} unionmulti PS,K, {〈f ⇀ a, s.mf⇀a〉} unionmulti Q,S〉 ι(f⇀a)=∅−−−−−−→
〈{〈a, la〉} ∪ PS,K, {〈f ⇀ a,mf⇀a〉} ∪ Q,S ∪ {{enc (s, k)}B enc (r, k)}〉
Table 1: Configuration transitions
Definition 2.7. A symbolic execution ESPS of protocol session PS (with
intruders layout ι) is a sequence of configurations obtained by application of
transitions to the initial configuration
〈
PS, {〈I,K0I 〉}I∈I , {〈c, ∅〉}c∈C , ∅
〉
.
For a substitution σ and a configuration Π =〈
{〈ai, li〉}i=1,...,k , {〈Ii, Ki〉}i=1,...,N , {〈c,mc〉}c∈C , {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
〉
we define Πσ
as
〈
{〈ai, liσ〉}i=1,...,k , {〈Ii, Kiσ〉}i=1,...,N , {〈c,mcσ〉}c∈C , {Eiσ B tiσ}i=1,...,n
〉
,
where substitutions are applied to lists elementwise.
Definition 2.8. An execution EPS = {Ciσ}i=1,...,m is an instance of a sym-
bolic execution {Ci}i=1,...,m (where Ci = 〈PSi,Ki,Qi,Si〉) such that all terms
of Ciσ are ground and Sm is satisfied by σ.
Now we describe the transitions of Table 1. Transition 1 expresses the
possibility of intruder I controlling channel f ⇀ a to impersonate f and send
to a some message compliant with the expected by a pattern r, if the current
knowledge of I allows it. An intruder can also intercept messages sent on
the channel that he controls (Transition 2). A message sent by an agent on
the channel free from intruders is put to the end of the queue of this channel
(Transition 3). Transition 4 represents the reading of a message from the
queue of the channel.
Let us explain where the constraint {enc (s, k)} B enc (r, k) comes from
in the last transition. Agent a expects to read a message from the channel
compatible with the pattern r. The first (possibly not yet instantiated)
message in the queue is s. Thus, r and s must be unifiable (modulo considered
equational theory), and even equivalent when we consider ground instances
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of the symbolic executions. Since we will be interested only in concrete
executions, but not symbolic, we can use this constraint to express equivalence
between r and s (Lemma 1).
Lemma 1. For terms t1, t2 and substitution σ, pt1σq = pt2σq is true iff σ
is a model of {enc (t1, k)}B enc (t2, k) for any term k, i.e. pt1σq = pt2σq iff
penc (t1, k)σq ∈ Der ({penc (t2, k)σq}).
Offline communication. At some point the current knowledge of all local
intruders can be shared to derive a secret which probably they cannot deduce
separately. In some cases these offline interactions are time-consuming and
may be detected. Therefore we consider reasonable that in the intruder
strategy modelling they take place after the protocol is over.
Coordinated attack problem. Now we can formally state the problem.
Input: A finite set of agents A, a protocol session PS = {〈ai, li〉}i=1,...,k, a
set of intruders I = {Ii}i=1,...,N each with initial knowledge K0Ii , an intruder
layout ι and some sensitive data given as a finite set of ground terms S.
Output: s ∈ S and an execution EPS of protocol session PS with its last
configuration 〈PS,K,Q,S〉 such that s ∈ Der
(⋃
〈KI ,I〉∈KKI
)
.
2.1.2. Solving the problem
We proceeds as follows:
1. Guess a sensitive datum s from S.
2. Guess a symbolic execution ESPS of some length ≤
∑
〈a,l〉∈PS
length(l) <∞.
3. For the last configuration
〈
PS, {〈KI , I〉}I∈I ,Q,S
〉
of ESPS, if constraint
system S ∪
{⋃
〈KI ,I〉∈KKI B s
}
is satisfiable with some σ, then the
protocol session is insecure and we return EPS = E
S
PSσ.
We will show in Sections 3 and 4 that the satisfiability of constraint
systems is in NP in the case of DY+ACI deduction theory.
2.2. Attack exploiting XML format of messages
Here we show how to model (using our formalism) attacks based on an
XML-representation of messages. A different technique to handle this kind of
attacks was presented in [20].
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Client Shop Interface
Shop Stock
 + Delivery
ItemID,Cheque,Address,Comments
Check the price of item
and use the cheque
ItemID,Address,Comments
Send ordered item to given Address
Figure 2: Ordering item scenario
We consider an e-shop that accepts e-cheques, and we suppose that it is
presented by a Web Service using SOAP protocol for exchanging messages.
It consists of two services:
• the first exposes the list of goods for sale with their prices and process
the orders by accepting payment,
• the second is a delivery service; it receives information from the first
one about successfully paid orders, and sends the ordered goods to the
buyer.
A simple scenario for ordering item is shown in Figure 2. First, a client
sends an order using e-shop interface that consists of an item identifier, e-
cheque, delivery address and some comments. Then, the first service of the
e-shop checks whether the price of the ordered item corresponds to the received
cheque. If it does, the service consumes the cheque and resends the order to
the stock/delivery service (without the used e-cheque). Stock and delivery
service prepare a parcel with ordered item and send it to given address. The
comment is automatically printed on the parcel to give some information to
the postman about, for example, delivery time or access instructions.
Suppose, Alice has an e-cheque for 5e. She selected a simple pen (with
ItemID simple) to buy, but she liked very much a more expensive gilded one
(with ItemID gilded). Can we help Alice to get what she wants for what she
has?
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Let us formalize the behaviour of scenario players (terms, normalization
function and deduction system are defined as in § 3.1.1 except that we will
write (t1 · . . . · tn) instead of · ({t1, . . . , tn})). Identifiers starting from a capital
letter are considered as variables; numbers and identifier starting from lower-
case letter are considered as constants. We model a delivery of item with
some ItemID to address Address with comments Comments by the following
message: sig ((ItemID ·Address ·Comments), priv (ks)) — a message signed
by e-shop, where ks its public key, such that no one can produce this message
except the shop. We abstract away from the procedure of checking price of
the item and will suppose, that Shop Interface expects 5e e-cheque for Item
“simple”. For simplicity we assume only two items.
We will use notation for sending and receiving as in § 2.1.
For Shop Interface we have:
?Client(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm);
!Delivery(simple · IAddr · IComm).
For Shop Stock/Delivery we have:
?Interface(DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm);
!Client sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm), priv (ks)) .
Alice initially has:
simple, gilded: identifiers of items;
cheque5: an e-cheque for 5e;
addr: her address;
cmnts: residence digital code;
ks: a public key of the shop.
Now we build a mixed constraint system (derivation constraints and
equations) to know, whether Alice can do what she wants:
{gilded, simple, cheque5, addr, cmnts, ks} B
(simple · cheque5 · IAddr · IComm)
(simple · IAddr · IComm) =ACI(DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm)
{gilded, simple, cheque5, addr, cmnts, ks,
sig ((DItemID ·DAddr ·DComm), priv (ks))} B
sig ((gilded · addr ·DComm), priv (ks))

(1)
(2)
(3)
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Constraint (1) shows, that Alice can construct a message expected by
the shop from a client. Constraint (2) represents a request from the first
to the second service of the shop: left-hand side is a message sent by the
interface service, and right-hand side is a message expected by stock/delivery
subservice. The last constraint shows, that from the received values Alice can
build a message that models a delivery of item with ItemID gilded.
To solve it, we first get rid of syntactic equations by applying most general
unifier; and then of equations modulo ACI (t1 =ACI t2 is equivalent to
pt1q = pt2q) by encoding them into deduction rules (as it was done in § 2.1.2).
Then, one of the solutions is:
IAddr 7→addr IComm 7→(gilded · cmnts)
DItemID 7→gilded DAddr 7→addr
DComm 7→(simple · cmnts)
From this solution we see, that Alice can send a not well-formed comments
(that presents two XML-nodes), and Delivery service parser can choose an
entry with ID gilded. An attack-request can look like this:
<ItemID>s imple</ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5</Cheque>
<Address>addr</ Address>
<Comments>cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d e d</ItemID>
The parser of the first service can return value of the first occurrence of
ItemID: <ItemID>simple</ItemID>. But the parser of the second one can
return <ItemID>gilded</ItemID>.
This attack is possible, if Alice constructs a request “by hand”, but a
similar attack is probably feasible using XML-injection: Alice when filling a
request form enters instead of her comments the following string:
cmnts</Comments>
<ItemID>g i l d e d</ItemID><Comments>
and in the resulting request we get:
<ItemID>s imple</ItemID>
<Cheque>cheque5</Cheque>
<Address>addr</ Address>
<Comments>cmnts</Comments>
13
<ItemID>g i l d e d</ItemID><Comments>
</Comments>
This kind of XML-injection attacks was described in [21].
3. Satisfiability of general DY+ACI constraint systems
In Section 2 we reduced the problem of protocol insecurity in presence of
several intruders to solving a system of deducibility constraints. In this section
we present a decision procedure for a constraint system where Dolev-Yao
deduction system is extended by an associative-commutative-idempotent sym-
bol (DY+ACI). We consider operators for pairing, symmetric and asymmetric
encryptions, decryption, signature and an ACI operator that will be used as
a set constructor.
As for the proof structure, after introducing the formal notations, the
main steps to show the decidability are as follows:
1. We present an algorithm for solving a ground derivability in DY+ACI
model.
2. We prove, that the normalization does not change satisfiability: either
we normalize a model or a constraint system.
3. We show existence of a conservative solution of satisfiable constraint
system: a substitution σ that sends a variable to an ACI-set of quasi-
subterms of the constraint system instantiated with σ together with
priv-ed atoms of the constraint system;
4. We give a bound on size of a conservative solution, and, as consequence,
we obtain decidability.
3.1. Formal introduction to the problem
3.1.1. Terms and notions
Definition 3.1. Terms are defined according to the following grammar:
term ::= variable | atom | pair (term, term) |
enc (term, term) | ·(tlist) | priv (Keys) |
aenc (term,Keys) | sig (term, priv (Keys))
Keys ::= variable | atom
tlist ::= term | term, tlist
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where atom ∈ A and variable ∈ X . We denote T (A,X ) the set of all terms
over a set of atoms A and a set of variables X . For short, we write T instead
of T (A,X ).
By sig (p, priv (a)) we mean a signature of message p with private key
priv (a) We do not assume that one can retrieve the message itself from the
signature.
Note that we do allow complex keys for symmetric encryption only. As a
consequence, we have to introduce a condition on substitution applications:
substitution σ cannot be applied to the term t, if after replacing the resulting
entity is not a term (for example, we cannot apply σ = {x 7→ pair (a, b)} to
the term aenc (a, x)).
We denote a term on i-th position of a list L as L[i]. Then t ∈ L is a
shortcut for ∃i : t = L[i]. We also define two binary relations ⊆ and ≈ on
lists as follows: L1 ⊆ L2 if and only if any t ∈ L1 implies t ∈ L2; L1 ≈ L2 if
and only if L1 ⊆ L2 and L2 ⊆ L1, and naturally extend them if L1 or L2 is a
set.
Definition 3.2. We consider symbol · to be associative, commutative, idem-
potent (shortly, ACI).
We will use bin throughout the paper as a generalization of all binary
operators: bin ∈ {enc, aenc, pair, sig}.
Definition 3.3. For every term t ∈ T we define its root symbol by
root (t) =

bin, if t = bin (p, q)
·, if t = · (L) ,
priv, if t = priv (p) ,
t, if t ∈ X ∪ A,
Definition 3.4. For any term t ∈ T we define its set of elements by:
elems (t) =
{⋃
p∈L elems (p) if t = · (L) ;
{t} , otherwise.
We extend elems () to sets of terms or lists of terms T by elems (T ) =⋃
t∈T elems (t).
Example 1. For term t = · ({a, · ({b, a, pair (a, b)}) , pair (· ({b, b}) , a)}) set
of its elements is elems (t) = {a, b, pair (· ({b, b}) , a) , pair (a, b)}.
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Definition 3.5. Let ≺ be a strict total order on T , such that comparing can
be done in polynomial time.
Definition 3.6. The cardinality of a set P is denoted by |P |.
Definition 3.7. The normal form of a term t (denoted by ptq) is recursively
defined by:
• ptq = t, if t ∈ X ∪ A
• pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (pt1q , pt2q)
• ppriv (t)q = priv (ptq)
• p· (L)q =

· (L′) , if |pelems (L)q| > 1 and L′ ≈ pelems (L)q
and for all i < j, L′[i] ≺ L′[j];
t′, if pelems (L)q = {t′}
,
where for set of terms T , pTq = {ptq : t ∈ T}.
We can show easily that two terms are congruent modulo the ACI proper-
ties of ′′.′′ iff they have the same normal form. Other properties are stated in
Lemma 4.
Example 2. Referring to Example 1 for the value of term t, we have ptq =
· ({a, b, pair (a, b) , pair (b, a)}).
Definition 3.8. Let t be a term. We define a set of quasi-subterms QSub (t)
as follows:
QSub (t) =

{t}, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
{t} ∪QSub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪QSub (t1) ∪QSub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
{t} ∪⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (p) , if t = · (L)
If T — set of terms, then QSub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T QSub (t). If S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
is a constraint system, we define QSub (S) = ⋃t∈⋃ni=1 Ei∪{ti}QSub (t).
Example 3. Referring to Example 1, we have
QSub (t) = {· ({a, · ({b, a, pair (a, b)}) , pair (· ({b, b}) , a)}) ,
a, b, pair (a, b) , pair (· ({b, b}) , a) , · ({b, b})}.
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Definition 3.9. Let t be a term. We define Vars (t) as set of all the variables
in t:
Vars (t) = X ∩ Sub (t)
We define Sub(t) as the set of subterms of t and the DAG-size of a term,
as the number of its different subterms. The DAG-size gives the size of a
natural representation of a term in the considered ACI theory.
Definition 3.10. Let t be a term. We define Sub (t) as follows:
Sub (t) =

{t}, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) , if t = priv (t1) ;
{t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
{t} ∪⋃p∈L Sub (p) , if t = · (L) .
If T is a set of terms, then Sub (T ) =
⋃
t∈T Sub (t). If S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n is
a constraint system, we define Sub (S) = ⋃t∈⋃ni=1 Ei∪{ti} Sub (t).
Example 4. Referring to Example 1, we have
Sub (t) = {· ({a, · ({b, a, pair (a, b)}) , pair (· ({b, b}) , a)}) ,
· ({b, a, pair (a, b)}) , pair (· ({b, b}) , a) ,
a, b, pair (a, b) , · ({b, b})}.
Definition 3.11. We define a DAG-size sizeDAG of a term t as sizeDAG (t) =
|Sub (t)|, for set of terms T , sizeDAG (T ) = |Sub (T )| and for constraint system
S as sizeDAG (S) = |Sub (S)|.
Remark, that for a constraint system such a definition does not polynomi-
ally approximate a number of bits needed to write it down(cf. Def. 4.1).
We define a Dolev-Yao deduction system modulo ACI equational theory
(denoted DY+ACI). It consists of composition rules and decomposition rules,
depicted in Table 2 where t1, t2, . . . , tm ∈ T .
We suppose, hereinafter, that for a constraint system S, QSub (S)∩A 6= ∅.
Otherwise, we can add one constraint {a}B a to S which will be satisfied by
any substitution. We denote {priv (t) : t ∈ T} for set of terms T as priv (T ).
We define Vars (S) = ⋃ni=1 Vars (Ei)∪Vars (ti). We say that S is normalized,
iff for all t ∈ QSub (S), t is normalized.
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Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q enc (t1, t2) , pt2q→ pt1q
t1, t2 → paenc (t1, t2)q aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q
t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q
t1, priv (t2)→ psig (t1, priv (t2))q pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q
t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq for all i
Table 2: DY+ACI deduction system rules
Example 5. We give a sample of general constraint system and its solution
within DY+ACI deduction system.
S =
{
enc (x, a) , pair (c, a) B b
· ({x, c}) B a
}
,
where a, b, c ∈ A and x ∈ X . One of the eventual models within DY+ACI is
σ = {x 7→ enc (pair (a, b) , c)}.
Definition 3.12. Let T = {t1, . . . , tk} be a non-empty set of terms. Then
we define pi(T ) as follows:
pi(T ) = p· (t1, . . . , tk)q
Remark: pi({t}) = ptq.
Definition 3.13. We denote QSub (S) \ X as QS˚ub (S,X ) or, for shorter
notation, QS˚ub (S).
We introduce a transformation pi(HS,σ (·)) on ground terms that replaces
recursively all binary root symbols such that they are different from all the
non-variable quasi-subterms of the constraint system instantiated with its
model σ, with ACI symbol ·. Later, we will show, that pi(H (σ)) is also a
model of S.
Definition 3.14. Let us have a constraint system S which is satisfiable with
model σ. Let us fix some α ∈ (A ∩QSub (S)). For given S and σ we define
a function HS,σ (·) : Tg → 2Tg as follows:
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HS,σ (t) =

{α} , if t ∈ (A \QSub (S));
{a} , if t = a ∈ (A ∩QSub (S));{
priv
(
pi(HS,σ (t1))
)}
, if t = priv (t1) ;{
bin
(
pi(HS,σ (t1)), pi(HS,σ (t2))
)}
, if t = bin (t1, t2)
ptq ∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq
HS,σ (t1) ∪HS,σ (t2) , if t = bin (t1, t2)
∧ ptq /∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq⋃
p∈LH
S,σ (p) , if t = · (L) .
Henceforward, we will omit parameters and write H (·) instead of HS,σ (·)
for shorter notation.
Definition 3.15. We define the superposition of pi(·) and H (·) on a set of
terms T = {t1, . . . , tk} as follows: pi(H (T )) = {pi(H (t)) | t ∈ T}.
Definition 3.16. Let θ = {x1 7→ t1, . . . , xk 7→ tk} be a substitution. We
define pi(H (θ)) the substitution {x1 7→ pi(H (t1)), . . . , xk 7→ pi(H (tk))}.
Note, that dom (pi(H (θ))) = dom (θ).
Example 6. We refer to Example 5 and show, that pi(H (σ)) is also a
model of S. pi(H (enc (pair (a, b) , c))) = pi(H (pair (a, b)) ∪ {c}) = pi({a} ∪
{b} ∪ {c}) = · ({a, b, c}) (we suppose that a ≺ b ≺ c). One can see, that
pi(H (σ)) = {x 7→ · ({a, b, c})} is also a model of S within DY+ACI.
3.1.2. General properties used in proof
The two following lemmas state simple properties of derivability.
Lemma 2. Let A,B,C ⊆ Tg. Then if A ⊆ Der (B) and B ⊆ Der (C) then
A ⊆ Der (C).
Lemma 3. Let A,B,C,D ⊆ Tg. Then if A ⊆ Der (B) and C ⊆ Der (D)
then A ∪ C ⊆ Der (B ∪D).
In Lemma 4 we list some auxiliary properties that will be used in main
proof.
Lemma 4. The following statements are true:
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1. For terms t, t1, t2, we have p· (t, t)q = ptq, p· (t1, t2)q = p· (t2, t1)q,
p· (· (t1, t2) , t3)q = p· (t1, · (t2, t3))q = p· (t1, t2, t3)q
2. if t and tσ are terms, then ptσq = pptσqq = pptqσq = pt pσqq =
pptq pσqq
3. s ∈ QSub (ptq) =⇒ s = psq
4. ∀s ∈ Sub (ptq)∃s′ ∈ Sub (t) : s = ps′q
5. pelems (t)q = elems (ptq)
6. p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q = p· (t1, . . . , tm)q; pi(T ) = pi(pTq)
7. elems (p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q) = elems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)) =⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ptiq)
8. H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p),
9. H (t) = H (ptq)
10. pi(H (t)) = pi(H (ptq)) = ppi(H (t))q = ppi(H (ptq))q
11. pi(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = pi({pi(T1), . . . , pi(Tm)})
12. QSub (QSub (t)) = QSub (t)
13. QSub (ptq) ⊆ pQSub (t)q
14. QSub (tσ) ⊆ QSub (t)σ ∪QSub (Vars (t)σ)
15. Sub (tσ) = Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ)
16. |pTq| ≤ |T |, |Tσ| ≤ |T |
17. elems (t) ⊆ QSub (t) ⊆ Sub (t)
18. For term t, sizeDAG (ptq) ≤ sizeDAG (t);
for set of terms T , sizeDAG (pTq) ≤ sizeDAG (T );
for constraint system S, sizeDAG (pSq) ≤ sizeDAG (S)
19. QSub (· ({t1, . . . , tl})) ⊆ {· ({t1, . . . , tl})} ∪QSub (t1) · · · ∪QSub (tl)
20. ∀s ∈ Sub (t) sizeDAG (ptσq) ≥ sizeDAG (psσq).
Proof. We will give proofs of several statements. Some other technical proofs
are given in Appendix B.1
Statement 5: This statement is trivial, if t 6= · (L). Otherwise, let t =
· (t1, . . . , tn).
• if pelems (t)q = {p}, where p 6= · (Lp). Then ptq = p and then
elems (ptq) = elems (p) = {p} = pelems (t)q.
• if pelems (t)q = {p1, . . . , pk}, k > 1, where pi 6= · (Li) for all i.
Then ptq = · (L), where L ≈ {p1, . . . , pk}. That means, that
elems (ptq) =
⋃
p∈{p1,...,pk} elems (p) = {p1, . . . , pk}.
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Statement 6: The first part follows from the definition of normal form and
Statement 5. The second one directly follows from the first.
Statement 9: By induction on sizeDAG (t):
• sizeDAG (t) = 1 is possible in the only case: t = a ∈ A and as
a = paq, the equality is trivial.
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), H (t) = H (ptq)
holds.
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. We need to prove that
H (t) = H (ptq).
– if t = priv (t1), then H (t) = {priv (pi(H (t1)))} = (by induc-
tion supposition) = {priv (pi(H (pt1q)))} = H (priv (pt1q)) =
H (ptq).
– if t = bin (p, q) and ptq ∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq. Then H (ptq) =
H (bin (ppq , pqq)) = {bin (pi(H (ppq)), pi(H (pqq)))} = (by in-
duction supposition) = {bin (pi(pH (p)q), pi(pH (q)q))} = (by
Statement 6) = {bin (pi(H (p)), pi(H (q)))} = H (bin (p, q)).
– if t = bin (p, q) and ptq /∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq. Then H (t) =
H (p) ∪ H (q) = (by induction) = H (ppq) ∪ H (pqq) = (as
pbin (ppq , pqq)q = ptq /∈ pQS˚ub (S)σq)
= H (bin (ppq , pqq)) = H (ptq)
– if t = · (L), where L = {t1, . . . , tm}. Note first, that as
t = · (L), we have for alls ∈ elems (t), sizeDAG (s) < sizeDAG (t).
Then, by Statement 8, H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p) = (by in-
duction supposition) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (ppq). On the other
part, H (ptq) =
⋃
p∈elems(ptq)H (p) = (by Statement 5) =⋃
p∈pelems(t)qH (p) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (ppq) = H (t).
Statement 11: From definition of pi and Statement 5, we obtain that
elems (pi(Ti)) = pelems (Ti)q. Next pi({pi(T1), . . . , pi(Tm)}) = p· (L)q
(here we use p· (L)q to capture two cases from definition of normalization
at once), where L ≈ pelems ({pi(T1), . . . , pi(Tm)})q =
p
⋃
i=1,...,m pelems (Ti)qq = p
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (Ti)q,
while pi(T1 ∪ · · · ∪ Tm) = p· (L′)q, where L′ ≈ p
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (Ti)q.
Statement 13: By induction on sizeDAG (t).
21
• sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then t ∈ A ∪ X . As QSub (t) = {t} and t = ptq,
the statement holds.
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), the statement is
true.
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible
cases:
– t = bin (t1, t2).On the one hand, QSub (t) = {t}∪QSub (t1)∪
QSub (t2). On the other hand, ptq = bin (pt1q , pt2q) and
then, QSub (ptq) = {ptq}∪QSub (pt1q)∪QSub (pt2q). Then,
as QSub (ptiq) ⊆ pQSub (ti)q, we have that QSub (ptq) ⊆
pQSub (t)q.
– t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
– t = · (L). We have QSub (t) = {t} ∪ ⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (p).
From Statement 5 we have elems (p· (L)q) = pelems (· (L))q,
and then, QSub (p· (L)q) =
{p· (L)q} ∪⋃p∈elems(p·(L)q) QSub (p) =
p{· (L)}q ∪⋃p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (ppq) ⊆ (by supposition)
⊆ p{· (L)}q ∪⋃p∈elems(·(L)) pQSub (p)q =
p{· (L)} ∪⋃p∈elems(·(L)) QSub (p)q = pQSub (t)q.
Statement 14: By induction on sizeDAG (t)
• sizeDAG (t) = 1.
– t ∈ A. As tσ = t and Vars (t) = ∅, the statement becomes
trivial.
– t ∈ X . Then QSub (t)σ = tσ, Vars (t) = {t}; We have
QSub (tσ) ⊆ {tσ} ∪QSub (tσ).
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k ≥ 1), the statement is
true.
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible
cases:
– t = bin (t1, t2). Then tσ = bin (t1σ, t2σ) and Vars (t) =
Vars (t1) ∪ Vars (t2). QSub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪QSub (t1σ)∪
QSub (t2σ) ⊆ (as sizeDAG (ti) < k) ⊆ {tσ} ∪ QSub (t1)σ ∪
QSub (Vars (t1)σ)∪QSub (t2)σ∪QSub (Vars (t2)σ) = {tσ}∪
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QSub (t1)σ ∪QSub (t2)σ ∪QSub ((Vars (t1) ∪ Vars (t2))σ) =
QSub (t)σ ∪QSub (Vars (t)σ).
– t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
– t = · ({t1, . . . , tm}). We have tσ = · ({t1σ, . . . , tmσ}) and
Vars (t) =
⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti). Then we have QSub (tσ) =
{tσ} ∪ ⋃p∈elems({t1σ,...,tmσ}) QSub (p) ⊆ (using Statement 17)
⊆ {tσ} ∪⋃p∈⋃mi=1QSub(tiσ) QSub (p) = (as QSub (QSub (p)) =
QSub (p)) = {tσ} ∪⋃i=1,...,m QSub (tiσ) ⊆ (as sizeDAG (ti) <
k)
⊆ {tσ}∪⋃i=1,...,m (QSub (ti)σ ∪QSub (Vars (ti)σ)) = {tσ}∪⋃
i=1,...,m QSub (ti)σ ∪QSub
((⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti)
)
σ
)
= QSub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
Lemma 5. Given a constraint system S and its model σ. Then substitution
pi(H (σ)) is normalized
Proof. For any x ∈ dom (pi(H (σ))), x pi(H (σ)) = pi(H (xσ)) = ppi(H (xσ))q
(by Lemma 4).
Lemma 6. For any normalized term t, QSub (t) = Sub (t).
Proof. By induction on sizeDAG (t).
• sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then t ∈ X ∪ A, and thus, QSub (t) = Sub (t) = {t}.
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), QSub (t) = Sub (t).
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. We need to show that
QSub (t) = Sub (t).
– t = bin (t1, t2). Then QSub (bin (t1, t2)) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪
QSub (t2) = (as sizeDAG (ti) < k) = {t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2) =
Sub (t)
– t = priv (t1). Then QSub (priv (t1)) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) = {t} ∪
Sub (t1) = Sub (t)
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– t = · (L). As t is normalized, we have that for all p ∈ L, p 6=
· (Lp). Then elems (L) ≈ L. Thus, we have QSub (t) = {t} ∪⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p) = {t}∪
⋃
p∈L QSub (p) = {t}∪
⋃
p∈L Sub (p) =
Sub (t).
In Proposition 1 we remark, that ACI-set of normalized terms has the
same deductive expressiveness as that set of normalized terms itself.
Proposition 1. Let T be a set of terms T = {t1, . . . , tk}. Then pi(T ) ∈
Der (pTq) and pTq ⊆ Der ({pi(T )}).
In Proposition 2 we state that a constraint system and its normal form
have the same models. In Proposition 3 we show the equivalence, for a
constraint system, between the existence of a model and the existence of a
normalized model. As a consequence we will need only to consider normalized
constraints and models in the sequel.
Proposition 2. The substitution σ is a model of constraint system S if and
only if σ is a model of pSq.
Proof. By definition, σ is a model of S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n, iff ∀i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
ptiσq ∈ Der (pEiσq). But by Lemma 4 we have that ptiσq = pptiqσq and
pEiσq = ppEiqσq. Thus, σ is a model of S if and only if σ is a model of
pSq.
Proposition 3. The substitution σ is a model of constraint system S if and
only if pσq is a model of S.
Proof. Proof is similar to one of Proposition 2.
3.2. Ground case of DY+ACI
In Algorithm 2 we need to check whether a ground substitution σ satisfies
a constraint system S. For this, we have to check the derivability of a ground
term from a set of ground terms. In this subsection we present such an
algorithm.
First, for the ground case we consider an equivalent to DY+ACI deduction
system DY+ACI’ obtained from the first by replacing a set of rules
∀i · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq
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with
∀s ∈ elems (t) t→ psq , if t = · (L) .
Now, we show an equivalence of the two deduction systems.
Lemma 7. t ∈ DerDY+ACI (E) ⇐⇒ t ∈ DerDY+ACI′ (E)
Proof sketch. We show that every rule of one deduction system can be simu-
lated by a combination of rules from the other. It is sufficient to show it for
non common rules.
The DY+ACI’ rules ∀s ∈ elems (t) t → psq , if t = · (L) are modeled
by successive application of rules ∀i · (t1, . . . , tm) → ptiq. The converse
simulation of · (t1, . . . , tm) → ptiq by DY+ACI’ is based on getting all the
normalized elements of ti and, if |pelems (ti)q| ≥ 2 then reconstructing ptiq
by rule p1, . . . , pl → p· (p1, . . . , pl)q, where p1, . . . , pl are pelems (ti)q.
Algorithm 1: Verifying derivability of term
Input: A normalized ground constraint E B t
Output: t ∈ DerDY+ACI (E)
1 Let S := QSub (E) ∪QSub (t) \ E;
2 Let D := E;
3 while true do
4 if exists DY rule l→ r, such that l ⊆ D and r ∈ S then
5 S := S \ {r};
6 D := D ∪ {r};
7 else
8 if exists s ∈ S : elems (s) ⊆ D then
9 S := S \ {s};
10 D := D ∪ {s};
11 else
12 if exists s ∈ D : elems (s) * D then
13 S := S \ elems (s);
14 D := D ∪ elems (s);
15 else
16 return t ∈ D;
17 end
18 end
19 end
20 end
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Lemma 8. For Algorithm 1 the following statements are true:
• for any step4, D ∪ S = QSub (E ∪ {t}) and D ∩ S = ∅;
• it terminates;
• for any step, D ⊆ DerDY+ACI (E).
The following lemmas will be used to prove correctness of the algorithm.
Lemma 9.
• For any decomposition rule l → r of DY+ACI’, if l is normalized, then
r is a quasi-subterm of l.
• For any composition rule l → r of DY+ACI’ except {t1, . . . , tm} →
p· (t1, . . . , tm)q, if l is normalized, then l ⊆ QSub (r).
Lemma 10. After the execution of Step 16 of Algorithm 1, if l → r is a
DY+ACI’ rule, such that l ⊆ D and r /∈ D, then l → r is a composition rule
and r /∈ QSub (E ∪ {t}).
Proof. Suppose, l → r is a decomposition. By Lemma 9 we have that
r ∈ QSub (l) and thus, r ∈ QSub (D) ⊆ D ∪ S. Then r /∈ D implies r ∈ S,
and then, Step 16 must be skipped, as branch 4 or 12 should have been
visited.
Thus, l→ r is a composition. As algorithm reached Step 16, that means
r /∈ S (otherwise one of three branches must be visited and this step would
be skipped). As r /∈ S and r /∈ D, we have r /∈ S ∪D = QSub (E ∪ {t}).
Lemma 11. Given a set of normalized terms S such that for any s ∈ S,
elems (s) ⊆ S. Then for any DY+ACI’ composition rule l → r such that
l ⊆ S we have elems (r) ⊆ S ∪ {r}.
Proof. All cases of composition rules except t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q are
trivial, as for them elems (r) = {r}. For this case, as elems (ti) ⊆ S for all i,
then (by Lemma 4, Statement 7) elems (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q) =
elems (· (t1, . . . , tm)) =
⋃m
i=1 elems (ti) ⊆ S.
Proposition 4. Algorithm 1 is correct.
4Consider two sequential assignments as one step
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Proof. If algorithm returns true, then, by Lemma 8, t ∈ DerDY+ACI′ (E).
Show, that output is correct, if algorithm returns false. Note, that we
consider values of D and S that they have after finishing the algorithm.
Suppose that output is false (t /∈ D), but t ∈ DerDY+ACI′ (E). Then there
exists minimal by length derivation {Ei}i=0,...,n where n ≥ 1, D = E0 (as
D ⊆ DerDY+ACI′ (E) and t /∈ D) and t ∈ En and Ei+1 \Ei 6= ∅ and Ei →li→ri
Ei+1 for all i = 0, . . . , n− 1. Then, applying Lemma 10 we have l0 → r0 is a
composition, and r0 /∈ QSub (E ∪ {t}).
Letm be the smallest index such that there exists s ∈ S = QSub (E ∪ {t})\
D and s ∈ Em.
Let k be the minimal integer, such that lk → rk is a decomposition.
Show, k ≤ m. Suppose the opposite, then s is built by a chain of
composition rules from D. If lm−1 → rm−1 (where rm−1 = s) is
• a rule in form of {t1, . . . , tc} → p· (t1, . . . , tc)q, then elems (s) 6= {s}
(otherwise it contradicts to minimality of the derivation) and from
Lemma 11, elems (s) ⊆ Em−1 (m 6= 1, otherwise this step would be
executed in the algorithm). As s ∈ S, then elems (s) ⊆ QSub (s) ⊆
QSub (E ∪ {t}). If elems (s) ⊆ D then we got contradiction with with
the fact, that this step would be executed in the algorithm. If there
exists e ∈ elems (s) and e /∈ D (that means, e ∈ S), then we get a
contradiction with the minimality of m, as e ∈ S was deduced before.
• any other composition rule, then by Lemma 9, lm−1 ⊆ QSub (s), and
thus, lm−1 ⊆ D ∪ S. Similarly to the previous case, m 6= 1 and we get a
contradiction with either minimality of m, or with the fact, that the
algorithm would have to add s into D.
Note, that this also shows, that decomposition rule is present in derivation.
Show, lk * D. Suppose the opposite. Then by Lemma 9, we have rk ⊆ D
what contradicts to Ek+1 \ Ek 6= ∅. Thus, at least one element from lk is not
from D. Let us consider all possible decomposition rules lk → rk:
• {pair (t1, t2)} → pt1q. We know, that pair (t1, t2) is not in D, thus,
it was built by composition. As Ei are normalized, the only possi-
ble way to build by composition pair (t1, t2) from normalized terms
is {t1, t2} → pair (t1, t2) (other ways, like pair (t1, t2) , pair (t1, t2) →
p· ({pair (t1, t2) , pair (t1, t2)})q would contradict the minimality of the
derivation). Thus, t1 was derived before (or was in D), i.e. t1 ∈ Ek.
That contradicts to Ek+1 \ Ek 6= ∅.
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• {pair (t1, t2)} → pt2q. Similar case.
• {enc (t1, t2) , pt2q} → pt1q. The case where enc (t1, t2) /∈ D has similar
explanations as two cases above. Thus, enc (t1, t2) ∈ D. That means,
t2 ∈ QSub (E ∪ {t}) and t2 /∈ D, i.e. t2 ∈ S. This means, t2 was
derived before and t2 ∈ S, what contradicts to k ≤ m.
• {aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q} → pt1q is a similar case to previous one. Note,
that if priv (t2) is not in D, that it must be obtained by decomposition.
• t→ psq, where s ∈ elems (t) and t = · (L). By Lemma 11, elems (t) ⊆
Ek, that contradicts minimality of derivation (Ek+1 \ Ek 6= ∅).
3.3. Existence of conservative solutions
In this subsection we will show that for any satisfiable constraint system,
there exist a model in special form (so called conservative solution). Roughly
speaking, a model in this form can be defined per each variable by set of
quasi-subterms of the constraint system and set of atoms (also from the
constraint system) that must be prived. This will bound a search space for
the model (see § 3.4).
First, we show, that on quasi-subterms of constraint system instantiated
with its model, the transformation pi(H (·)) will be a homomorphism modulo
normalization.
Proposition 5. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized
model σ. For all t ∈ QSub (S), pt pi(H (σ))q = ppi(H (tσ))q.
Proof. We will prove it by induction on |Sub (t)|, where t is normalized.
• Let |Sub (t)| = 1. Then:
– either t ∈ A. In this case t ∈ (A ∩ QSub (S)), and as tµ = t for
any substitution µ, then pi(H (tσ)) = pi(H (t)) = pi({t}) = t and
t pi(H (σ)) = t. Thus, t pi(H (σ)) = pi(H (tσ)).
– or t ∈ X . As σ is a model and t ∈ QSub (S), we have t ∈ dom (σ),
and, by definition, t ∈ dom (pi(H (σ))). Then, by definition of
pi(H (σ)), t pi(H (σ)) = pi(H (tσ)).
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• Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if |Sub (t)| ≤ k, then pt pi(H (σ))q =
ppi(H (tσ))q.
• Show, that for any t such that |Sub (t)| ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p, q)
or t = priv (q) or t = · (t1, . . . , tm), but |Sub (p)| ≤ k, |Sub (q)| ≤ k
and |Sub (ti)| ≤ k, for all i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, statement pt pi(H (σ))q =
ppi(H (tσ))q is still true. We have:
– either t = bin (p, q). As t = bin (p, q) ∈ QSub (S)⇒ p ∈ QSub (S)
and q ∈ QSub (S). As |Sub (p)| < |Sub (t)| and from the induction
assumption, we have pp pi(H (σ))q = ppi(H (pσ))q. The same holds
for q.
Again, since bin (p, q)σ ∈ QS˚ub (S)σ (as bin (p, q) /∈ X and t ∈
QSub (S)) we have that ppi(H (bin (p, q)σ))q =
ppi(H (bin (pσ, qσ)))q = ppi(H (pbin (pσ, qσ)q))q =
ppi(H (bin (ppσq , pqσq)))q =
ppi({bin (pi(H (ppσq)), pi(H (pqσq)))})q =
ppi({bin (ppi(H (pσ))q , ppi(H (qσ))q)})q =
pbin (ppi(H (pσ))q , ppi(H (qσ))q)q =
pbin (pp pi(H (σ))q , pq pi(H (σ))q)q =
pbin (p pi(H (σ)), q pi(H (σ)))q =
pbin (p, q) pi(H (σ))q = pt pi(H (σ))q.
– or t = · (t1, . . . , tm). As t is normalized, it implies that for all
i ∈ {1, . . . ,m}, ti are not in form of · (Li) and then ti ∈ QSub (S),
and thus, we have ti ∈ QSub (S) ∧ ppi(H (tiσ))q = pti pi(H (σ))q.
pi(H (tσ)) = pi(H (· (t1σ, . . . , tmσ))) = pi(H (t1σ)∪· · ·∪H (tmσ)) =
(by Statement 11 of Lemma 4)
= pi({pi(H (t1σ)), . . . , pi(H (tmσ))}) =
pi({pt1 pi(H (σ))q , . . . , ptm pi(H (σ))q}) =
p· (pt1 pi(H (σ))q , . . . , ptm pi(H (σ))q)q =
p· (t1 pi(H (σ)), . . . , tm pi(H (σ)))q =
p(· (t1, . . . , tm))pi(H (σ))q = pt pi(H (σ))q
– or t = priv (q). Then q ∈ QSub (S).
pi(H (tσ)) = pi({priv (pi(H (qσ)))}) = ppriv (pi(H (qσ)))q =
ppriv (q pi(H (σ)))q = ppriv (q) pi(H (σ))q = pt pi(H (σ))q.
Thus, the proposition is proven.
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Now we show, that relation of derivability between a term and a set of
terms is stable with regard to transformation pi(H (·)).
Lemma 12. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized
model σ. For any DY+ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r,
pi(H (r)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (l1)), . . . , pi(H (lk))}).
Proof idea. We proceed by considering all possible deduction rules. To give
an idea, we show a proof for only one rule (see full proof in Appendix B.3):
aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q → pt1q. Here we have to show that pi(H (pt1q)) is
derivable from {pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))), pi(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. Consider two cases:
• ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))),
and then pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({aenc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) , ppriv (pi(H (t2)))q}).
On the other hand, pi(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = pi(H (priv (t2))) =
pi({priv (pi(H (t2)))}) = ppriv (pi(H (t2)))q.
• @u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪H (t2)). Using Proposition 1, we have
pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus (by Lemma 4)
pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Proposition 1
we have that pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 2,
pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))).
Using Proposition 5 and Lemma 12 we will show, that transformation
pi(H (·)) preserves the property of substitution to be a model.
Theorem 1. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized
model σ. Then substitution pi(H (σ)) also satisfies S.
Proof. Suppose, without loss of generality, S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n. Let us take
any constraint (E B t) ∈ S. As σ is a model of S, there exists a derivation
D = {A0, . . . , Ak} such that A0 = pEσq and ptσq ∈ Ak.
By Lemma 12 and Lemma 3 we can easily prove that if k > 0, pi(H (Aj)) ⊆
Der (pi(H (Aj−1))) , j = 1, . . . , k. Then, applying transitivity of Der (·)
(Lemma 2) k times, we have that pi(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (pi(H (A0))). In the
case where k = 0, the statement pi(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (pi(H (A0))) is also true.
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Using Proposition 5 we get pi(H (A0)) = pi(H (Eσ)) = pE pi(H (σ))q, as
E ⊆ QSub (S). The same for t: pi(H (tσ)) = pt pi(H (σ))q, and as ptσq ∈
Ak, we have pt pi(H (σ))q ∈ pi(H (Ak)). Thus, we have that pt pi(H (σ))q ∈
pi(H (Ak)) ⊆ Der (pi(H (A0))) = Der (pE pi(H (σ))q), that means pi(H (σ))
satisfies any constraint of S.
From now till the end of subsection we will study a very useful property of
pi(H (σ)). Proposition 6 and its corollary show, that if constraint system has a
normalized model (σ) which sends different variables to different values, then
there exists another normalized model (pi(H (σ))) that sends any variable of
its domain to an ACI-set of some non-variable quasi-subterms of constraint
system instantiated by itself and some private keys built with atoms of the
constraint system.
Lemma 13. If puσq = enc (p, q), σ is normalized, u = puq, u /∈ X and
xσ 6= yσ, x 6= y, then there exists s ∈ QSub (u) such that s = enc (p′, q′)
and psσq = enc (p, q). The similar is true in the case of puσq = pair (p, q),
puσq = aenc (p, q), puσq = sig (p, q) and for puσq = priv (p).
Proof. As u = puq and puσq = enc (p, q), we have:
• u not in form of · (L). Then, as u /∈ X and puσq = enc (p, q), we have
u = enc (p′, q′) (where pp′σq = p and pq′σq = q). Then we can choose
s = enc (p′, q′) = u ∈ QSub (u).
• u = · (t1, . . . , tm), m > 1, as u = puq. Then, for all i, ti is either a
variable, or enc (p′i, q
′
i). But, as xσ 6= yσ, x 6= y and as σ is normalized,
we can claim, that {t1, . . . , tm} contains at most one variable. Then,
as m > 1, there exists i such that ti = enc (p
′
i, q
′
i). Then by definition
of normalization function, and from puσq = enc (p, q) we have, that
pelems (uσ)q = {enc (p, q)} and as tiσ is an element of uσ, we have
penc (p′i, q′i)σq = enc (p, q). Thus, we can choose s = ti, as ti ∈ QSub (u)
and ti = enc (p
′
i, q
′
i).
The other cases (pair, priv, etc...) can be proved similarly.
Proposition 6. Given a normalized constraint system S and its normalized
model σ such that for all x, y ∈ dom (σ), x 6= y =⇒ xσ 6= yσ. Then
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for all x ∈ dom (pi(H (σ))) there exist k ∈ N and s1, . . . , sk ∈ QS˚ub (S) ∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) such that root (si) 6= · and
x pi(H (σ)) = pi({s1 pi(H (σ)), . . . , sk pi(H (σ))}).
Proof. By definition, x pi(H (σ)) = pi(H (xσ)). Let us take any s ∈ H (xσ)
(note, that s is a ground term). Then, by definition of H (·) we have:
• either s ∈ A. Then, by definition of H (·), s ∈ (A ∩QSub (S)). Thus,
s pi(H (σ)) = s, s ∈ QS˚ub (S), s 6= · (L);
• or s = bin (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) and there exists u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such
that puσq = pbin (t1, t2)q = bin (pt1q , pt2q). As all conditions of
Lemma 13 are satisfied, then there exists v ∈ QSub (u) such that
pvσq = bin (pt1q , pt2q) and v = bin (p, q) and as u ∈ QS˚ub (S) then
v ∈ QS˚ub (S). By Proposition 5,
pv pi(H (σ))q = pi(H (vσ)) = pi(H (pvσq)) = pi(H (bin (t1, t2))) =
pi({bin (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2)))}) = bin (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) = s. That
means that there exists v ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that v 6= · (L) and
s = pv pi(H (σ))q.
• or s = priv (pi(H (t1))). In this case, as s is ground, pi(H (t1)) must be
an atom, moreover, by definition of H (·), this atom is from
(A∩QSub (S)). Therefore, s = priv (a), where a ∈ A∩QSub (S) (and
of course, s 6= · (L)).
Thus, for all s ∈ H (xσ), there exists
v ∈ (QSub (S)) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) \ X | s = pv pi(H (σ))q. Therefore, as
x pi(H (σ)) = pi(H (xσ)), we have that x pi(H (σ)) =
pi({ps1 pi(H (σ))q , . . . , psk pi(H (σ))q}) = pi({s1 pi(H (σ)), . . . , sk pi(H (σ))}),
where s1, . . . , sk ∈ QS˚ub (S) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) and
si 6= · (L) ,∀1 ≤ i ≤ k. That proves the proposition.
Corollary 1. Given normalized constraint system S and σ′ — its normalized
model, such that x 6= y =⇒ xσ′ 6= yσ′. Then there exists a normalized
model σ of S such that for all x ∈ dom (σ) there exist k ∈ N and s1, . . . , sk ∈
QS˚ub (S)∪priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) such that xσ = pi({s1σ, . . . , skσ}) and si 6= sj,
if i 6= j; si 6= · (L) ,∀i.
Any normalized model with property shown in Corollary 1 we will call
conservative.
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3.4. Bounds on conservative solutions
To get a decidability result, we first show an upper bound on size of
conservative model and then, by reducing any satisfiable constraint system to
one that have conservative model and showing that reduced one is smaller
(by size) than original one, we obtain an existence of a model with bounded
size for any satisfiable constraint system.
Lemma 14. Given a normalized constraint system S and its conservative
model σ. Then for all x ∈ Vars (S) we have QSub (xσ) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
Proof. Given a ground substitution σ, let us define a strict total order on
variables: x @ y ⇐⇒ (sizeDAG (xσ) < sizeDAG (yσ)) ∨ (sizeDAG (xσ) =
sizeDAG (yσ) ∧ x ≺ y).
By Proposition 6 for all x xσ = pi({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}), where sxi ∈ (QSub (S)\
X ) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) and sxi 6= · (L).
Let us show that if y ∈ Vars (sxi ) for some i, then y @ x. Suppose, that
y ∈ Vars (sxi ) and x @ y. Then sizeDAG (xσ) = sizeDAG (pi({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ})) =
sizeDAG (p· (sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ)q) ≥ (by Lemma 4) ≥ sizeDAG (psxi σq) >
sizeDAG (pyσq), because we know that sxi = bin (p, q) or sxi = priv (p) and
y ∈ Vars (sxi ) (for example, in first case, sizeDAG (psxi σq) =
sizeDAG (bin (ppσq , pqσq)) = 1 + sizeDAG ({ppσq , pqσq}) and
since y ∈ Vars ({p, q}), using Statement 20 of Lemma 4, we get
sizeDAG (psxi σq) ≥ 1 + sizeDAG (pyσq)) And as sizeDAG (pyσq) = sizeDAG (yσ)
That means, y @ x. Contradiction.
Now we show by induction main property of this lemma.
• let x = min@(Vars (S)).
Then xσ = pi({sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ}) = p· (sx1σ, . . . , sxkxσ)q and all sxi
are ground (as there does not exists y @ x). Then xσ = p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q.
We have that QSub (xσ) = {p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q} ∪ QSub (sx1) ∪ · · · ∪
QSub (sxkx) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (A ∩QSub (S)), as for any s ∈
QSub (sxi ), s ∈ Tg and s ∈ QSub (S) or s = priv (a) or s = a,
where a ∈ QSub (S) ∩ A, therefore s = psq = sσ ∈ pQSub (S)σq ∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) and p· (sx1 , . . . , sxkx)q = xσ ∈ pQSub (S)σq.
• Suppose, that for all z @ y we have
QSub (zσ) ⊆ pQSub (Sσ)q ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
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• Show, that QSub (yσ) ⊆ QSub (Sσ) ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A). We know
that yσ = pi({sy1σ, . . . , sykyσ}) = p· (sy1σ, . . . , sykyσ)q and for any z ∈
Vars (syi ), z @ y. Then we have QSub (yσ) =
{yσ} ∪ QSub (psy1σq) ∪ · · · ∪ QSub (psykyσq). We know that yσ ∈
pQSub (S)σq. Let us show that QSub (psyi σq) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A). By Lemma 4 we have QSub (psyi σq) ⊆
pQSub (syi σ)q ⊆ pQSub (syi )σ ∪QSub (Vars (syi )σ)q =
pQSub (syi )σq ∪QSub (Vars (syi )σ). We can see that pQSub (syi )σq ⊆
pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A) (as syi ∈ QSub (S)∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A)); and by induction supposition and by statement
proved above we have QSub (Vars (syi )σ) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq∪
priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
Thus, QSub (yσ) ⊆ pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (QSub (S) ∩ A).
Proposition 7. For normalized constraint system S that have conservative
model σ, for any x ∈ Vars (S) we have sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S).
Proof. As |pSub (S)σq| ≤ |Sub (S)σ| ≤ |Sub (S)| = sizeDAG (S), we have
(using the fact that σ is normalized and Lemma 14) that |Sub (xσ)| =
|QSub (xσ)| ≤ |pQSub (S)σq ∪ priv (A ∩QSub (S))| ≤ |pQSub (S)σq| +
|priv (A ∩QSub (S))| ≤ sizeDAG (S) + |A ∩ QSub (S)| ≤ 2 × sizeDAG (S);
thus, sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S).
From this proposition and Corollary 1 we obtain an existence of bounded
model for a normalized constraint system that have a model sending different
variables to different values. We will reduce an arbitrary constraint system to
already studied case. The target properties are stated in Proposition 8 and
Corollary 2.
Lemma 15. Given any constraint system S and any substitution θ such
that dom (θ) = Vars (S) and dom (θ) θ ⊆ dom (θ). Then sizeDAG (Sθ) ≤
sizeDAG (S).
Proof. From Lemma 4 we obtain sizeDAG (Sθ) = |Sub (Sθ)| = |Sub (S) θ ∪
Sub (Vars (S) θ)|, but Vars (S) θ ⊆ dom (θ) = Vars (S) (Vars (Sσ) consists
only of variables), and then Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Vars (S) θ. As Vars (S) ⊆
Sub (S), we have Sub (S) θ ∪ Sub (Vars (S) θ) = Sub (S) θ.
Thus, sizeDAG (Sθ) = |Sub (S) θ| ≤ |Sub (S)| = sizeDAG (S).
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Definition 3.17. Let σ and δ be substitutions. Then σ[δ] is a substitution
such that dom (σ[δ]) = dom (δ) and for all x ∈ dom (σ[δ]), xσ[δ] = (xδ)σ.
Lemma 16. Let θ and σ be substitutions such that dom (θ) θ = dom (σ),
dom (σ) ⊆ dom (θ) and σ is ground. Then, for any term t, (tθ)σ = tσ[θ].
Proof. When apply θ to t, every variable x of t such that x ∈ dom (θ) is
replaced by xθ; then we apply σ to tθ: every variable y of tθ is replaced by yσ,
thus, every variable x from dom (θ) will be replaced to (xθ)σ (as dom (θ) θ =
dom (σ)); and no other variables will be replaced (as dom (σ) ⊆ dom (θ)).
Thus, we can see that it is the same as in definition of σ[θ].
Proposition 8. Given any satisfiable constraint system S. Then there exists a
model σ of S such that for any x ∈ dom (σ), sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq)
Proof idea. Given a normalized model σ′ of S we build a substitution θ that
maps different variables whose σ′-instnatces are the same to one. In this way
we obtain a new constraint system and its normalized model on which we
can apply Corollary 1 and get its conservative model σ′′, and by applying
Proposition 7 we get a bound on size for this model. On the other part, we
use Lemma 16 to show that σ′′[θ] is a model of pSq. And then, using obtained
bound and Lemma 15 show existence of a model with stated property. The
detailed proof is given in Appendix B.4
Corollary 2. Constraint system S is satisfiable if and only if there exists a
normalized model of S defined on Vars (S) which maps a variable to a ground
term in T (A ∩QSub (pSq) , ∅) with size not greater than double sizeDAG (S).
Using this result, we propose an algorithm of satisfiability of constraint
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system (Algorithm 2).
Algorithm 2: Solving constraint system
Input: A constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
Output: Model σ, if exists; otherwise ⊥
1 Guess for every variable of S a value of ground normalized
substitution σ with size not greater than 2× sizeDAG (S);
2 if σ satisfies Ei B ti for all i = 1, . . . , n then
3 return σ
4 else
5 return ⊥
6 end
Proposition 9. Algorithm 2 is correct.
Proof. Let σ be an output of Algorithm 2. Then σ is a ground substitution
and σ satisfies all constraints from S ′ and therefore, satisfies all constraints
from S . This means, σ is a model of S.
Proposition 10. Algorithm 2 is complete.
Proof. Suppose, S is satisfiable. Then, by Corollary 2, there exists a guess of
value of ground substitution on every element of Vars (S) with size not greater
than 2× sizeDAG (S) which represents a model σ of S. Thus, algorithm 2 will
return this σ.
4. Complexity analysis
In this section we present complexity classes of proposed algorithms. First,
we expose what we use as a representation of constraint systems to justify the
selected measure of algorithms inputs. Then, we notice that normalization
algorithm is polynomial in time. After that we will show the polynomial
complexity of the ground derivability algorithm. And as a consequence of
the results given before, we obtain that the proposed algorithm for solving
general constraint system within DY+ACI model is in NP .
To reason about complexity, we have to define a size of its input. For
terms and set of terms, we will use sizeDAG (·) + |E (·)|, where E (·) is a set
of edges of DAG-representation of its argument. For system of constraints
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S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n we will use n× sizeDAG (S)+ |E (S)| . The justification
is given below.
Definition 4.1. DAG-representation of a constraint system S =
{Ei B ti}i=1,...,n is a tagged graph with labeled edges G = 〈V,E, tag〉 (V is a
set of vertices and E is a set of edges; tag is a tagging function defined on V)
such that:
• there exists a bijection f : V 7→ Sub (S);
• ∀v ∈ V tag (v) = 〈s,m〉, where
– s = root (f(v));
– m is 2n-bit integer, where m[2i − 1] = 1 ⇐⇒ f(v) ∈ Ei and
m[2i] = 1 ⇐⇒ f(v) = ti.
• v1 1−→ v2 ∈ E ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ T : (∃ bin : f(v1) = bin (f(v2), p)) ∨ f(v1) =
priv (f(v2));
• v1 2−→ v2 ∈ E ⇐⇒ ∃p ∈ T : ∃ bin : f(v1) = bin (p, f(v2));
• v1 i−→ v2 ∈ E ⇐⇒ f(v1) = · (L) ∧ L[i] = f(v2);
Example 7. A constraint system
S =

{enc (a, x) , pair (b, enc (a, a)) , c} Ba
{priv (b) , c} By
{enc (sig (a, priv (c)) , y) , aenc (x, b)} B pair (enc (a, x) , c)
will be represented as shown5 in Figure 3. Nodes of this graph represent an
element from Sub (S) by indicating its root symbol (first part of its tag) and
pointers to the children.
Remark that this representation can be refined, as we know that RHS of
a constraint is exactly one term. That is why we could tag a node not with
2n bits but with n+ dlog(n+ 1)e bits (concerning the second component of
the tagging function).
5Label “1” (resp.“2”) of an edge is represented by a left (resp. right) side of its source
node
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Figure 3: DAG-representation of constraint system S
The shown representation can be written in not more than P (n×|V(S)|+
|E (S)|) bits of space, where V(·) is a set of edges in the DAG-representation,
and P is some polynomial with non-negative coefficients. As we have a
bijection between V(S) and Sub (S), we obtain |V(S)| = sizeDAG (S). On the
other hand, as we are not interested in rigorous estimation of complexity,
but work in a polynomial class, we will estimate complexity of algorithms by
taking n× sizeDAG (S) + |E (S)| as the measure of constraint system S.
The DAG-representation of a term t has the similar structure as it was
shown for constraint system except that it does not need the second part of a
tagging function: we need only root (f(v)) as a node’s tag. The size of this
representation will be polynomially bounded by sizeDAG (t) + |E (t)|. Thus
we give the following definition:
Definition 4.2. The measure of term t is defined as: measure (t) = sizeDAG (t)+
|E (t)|. For a constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n, its measure: measure (S) =
n× sizeDAG (S) + |E (S)|.
Note that for the normalized terms and constraint systems, number of
edges in their DAG-representation are polynomially limited w.r.t. the number
of vertices:
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Lemma 17. For any normalized term t, |E (t)| < (sizeDAG (t))2. For any
normalized constraint system S, |E (S)| < (sizeDAG (S))2.
Proof. Since the term (resp. constraint system) is normalized, we cannot
have more than two edge between two nodes. It evidently holds for binary
and unary nodes; for ·-nodes it holds because of normalization: if a ·-node
has two edges to one child, the term is not normalized (one of these edges
should have been removed). Therefore, as the graph is directed and acyclic,
with as maximum two edges between two nodes, we have not more than
sizeDAG (x)× (sizeDAG (x)−1) edges (where x is a term t or constraint system
S).
4.1. Satisfiability of a general DY+ACI constraint systems is in NP
Lemma 18. Given a term t. Normalization can be done in polynomial time
on measure (t). The same holds for a constraint system S: normalization can
be done in polynomial time on measure (S).
Proof idea (for the case of terms). The algorithm of term normalization works
bottom-up by flattening nested ACI-sets, sorting children of ACI-set nodes,
merging duplicated nodes while removing unnecessary duplicating edges and
removing nodes without incoming edges (except the root-node of t).
Proposition 11. The general constraint system within DY+ACI satisfiability
problem, that Algorithm 2 solves, is in NP .
Proof. Algorithm 2 returns a proof for the decision problem if it exists. We
have to show, that the verification of this proof takes a polynomial time with
regard to the input problem measure. To do this, we will normalize Sσ and
then apply algorithm of checking ground derivability. Using the fact that
sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2 × sizeDAG (S) and polynomial complexity of the normal-
ization and the ground derivability, we can overapproximate the execution
time with polynomial on measure (S). The details of the proof are given in
Appendix B.2.
On the other hand, we can reuse a technique presented in [14] to show
that the satisfiability of a constraint system is an NP-hard problem. The
authors encoded 3-SAT problem into an insecurity problem of a single-session
sequential protocol. Because the steps of the protocol are linearly ordered,
the finding of an attack is reduced to the satisfiability problem of a single
constraint system.
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Theorem 2. Satisfiability of general DY+ACI constraint systems is NP -
complete.
4.2. Ground derivability in DY+ACI is in P
Proposition 12. Algorithm 1 has a polynomial complexity on
sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}).
Proof. We will give a very coarse estimate.
First remark, that in any step of algorithm, |S| and |D| don’t exceed
|QSub (E ∪ {t})|.
Building QSub (E) ∪ QSub (t) takes linear time on sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}).
Building S will take not more than O (|E| × |QSub (E) ∪QSub (t)|), that is,
not more than O
(
(sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}))2
)
.
The main loop has at most |QSub (E ∪ {t})| − |E| steps. Searching for
DY rule with left-hand side in D and right-hand side in S is not greater that
O(|S| × |D|2) and thus, not greater that O((sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}))3). The next
if can be performed in O(|S| × |D| × (sizeDAG (E ∪ {t}))) steps and the last
if can be also done for cubic time. The check done in return statement is
linear. And finally, thanks to the Statement 17 of Lemma 4, we can easily
justify the claimed complexity.
5. Satisfiability of general DY constraint system
The previous result on constraint solving for DY+ACI theory can be
projected to the classical DY case. We cannot apply it directly, as in the
resulting model we will probably have an ACI symbol. Thus, we need to
prove the decidability of DY case. The scheme we follow to solve a constraint
system within DY deduction system is shown in Figure 4.
First, we can show that if a constraint system is satisfiable within DY,
then it is satisfiable within DY+ACI (Proposition 13).
Second, as we know, we can find a model of a given constraint system
within DY+ACI.
Third, we will transform the model obtained from previous step (which is
in DY+ACI) in such a way, that the resulting substitution will be a model
of initial constraint system within DY(Theorem 3). The idea of satisfactory
transformation δ is simple: we replace any ACI list of terms with nested
pairs: · ({t1, . . . , tn}) we replace with pair (t1, pair (..., tn)). Note, that this
transformation will have a linear complexity and the transformed model will
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Figure 4: Proof Plan
have the DAG-size not more than twice bigger than initial. This gives us a
class of complexity, which is NP, for the problem of satisfiability of general
constraint system within DY model.
Definition 5.1. We define a replacement δ (t) : Tg 7→ Tg in the following
way:
δ (t) =

t, if t ∈ X ∪ A;
bin (δ (p) , δ (q)) , if t = bin (p, q) ,
priv (δ (p)) , if t = priv (p) ;
δ (t1) , if t = · (t1) ;
pair (δ (t1) , δ (· (t2, . . . , tm))) , if t = · (t1, . . . , tm) ,m > 1;
Definition 5.2. Given substitution σ. Then δ (σ) = {x→ δ (xσ)}x∈dom(σ).
For T ⊆ Tg, δ (T ) = {δ (t) : t ∈ T}.
Let us recall classical Dolev-Yao deduction system (DY) in Table 3.
Composition rules Decomposition rules
t1, t2 → enc (t1, t2) enc (t1, t2) , t2 → t1
t1, t2 → aenc (t1, t2) aenc (t1, t2) , priv (t2)→ t1
t1, t2 → pair (t1, t2) pair (t1, t2)→ t1
t1, priv (t2)→ sig (t1, priv (t2)) pair (t1, t2)→ t2
Table 3: DY deduction system rules
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Definition 5.3. A constraint system S standard, if for all s ∈ Sub (S)
root (s) 6= ·. The definition is extended in natural way to terms, sets of terms
and substitutions.
We can redefine the notion of derivation for Dolev-Yao deduction system
in a natural way, and denote it as DerDY .
Lemma 19. Any standard constraint system is normalized.
Lemma 20. Let t be a standard term, σ be a normalized substitution. Then
tσ is normalized.
Proposition 13. If a standard constraint system S has a model σ within
DY deduction system, then S has a model within DY+ACI deduction system.
Proof. It is enough to consider the same model σ in DY+ACI. As Sσ is
normalized and as DY+ACI includes all the rules from DY, it is easy to show
using the same derivation that proves σ to be a model in DY, that σ stays a
model of S in DY+ACI.
The goal of the following reasoning is to show that we can build a model
of a constraint system within DY from a model of this constraint system
within DY+ACI.
Lemma 21. For any DY+ACI rule l1, . . . , lk → r, if li are normalized for
all i = 1, . . . , k then δ (r) ∈ DerDY ({δ (l1) , . . . , δ (lk)}).
Proof. Let us consider all possible rules:
• t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q
As t1 and t2 are normalized, then ppair (t1, t2)q = pair (t1, t2). We can
see, that δ (pair (t1, t2)) = pair (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) ∈ DerDY ({δ (t1) , δ (t2)}).
• t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of
previous one.
• t1, t2 → paenc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of
previous one.
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• t1, priv (t2)→ psig (t1, priv (t2))q.
As t1 and priv (t2) are normalized, then psig (t1, priv (t2))q =
sig (t1, priv (t2)). We can see, that δ (sig (t1, priv (t2))) =
sig (δ (t1) , δ (priv (t2))) = sig (δ (t1) , priv (δ (t2))) ∈
DerDY ({δ (t1) , priv (δ (t2))}), but priv (δ (t2)) = δ (priv (t2)).
• t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q.
The fact, that elems (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q) =
⋃
i=1,...,m elems (ti) follows from
ti = ptiq (for all i) and Lemma 4.
We can (DY)-derive from {δ (ti)} any term in δ (elems (ti)), trivially, if
ti 6= · (L) and by applying rules pair (s1, s2) DY−−→ s1 and pair (s1, s2) DY−−→
s2 otherwise (proof by induction on size of ti).
One can observe, that δ (t) is a pairing (composition of pair (·, ·) operator
with itself) of δ (elems (t)) (by definition of δ (·) and normalization
function). And then, as δ (t) is limited in size, we can (DY)-derive
δ (t) from δ (elems (t)) by iterative use of rule s1, s2
DY−−→ pair (s1, s2), if
needed.
Thus, first we can derive δ (elems (ti)) for all i, and then rebuild (derive
with composition rules) δ (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q).
• enc (t1, t2) , pt2q→ pt1q.
As enc (t1, t2) is normalized, then t1 = pt1q and t2 = pt2q. Thus,
δ (t1) ∈ DerDY ({enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)) , δ (t2)}) and this is what we need, as
δ (enc (t1, t2)) = enc (δ (t1) , δ (t2)).
• pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Similar case.
• pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Similar case.
• aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q. Similar case. Note, that δ (priv (t2)) =
priv (δ (t2))
• · (t1, . . . , tm)→ ptiq.
As said above, δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))) ⊆ DerDY ({δ (· (t1, . . . , tm))});
and as δ (elems (ti)) ⊆ δ (elems (· (t1, . . . , tm))), we can (DY)-derive (by
composition rules) δ (ti) from δ (elems (ti)).
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Proposition 14. Given a standard constraint system S and its normalized
model σ in DY+ACI. Then, for any subterm of the system t ∈ Sub (S), we
have δ (tσ) = tδ (σ).
Proof. The proof is done by induction as in Proposition 5.
• Let sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then either t ∈ A or t ∈ X . Both are trivial cases.
• Assume that for some k ≥ 1 if sizeDAG (t) ≤ k, then δ (tσ) = tδ (σ).
• Show, that for t such that sizeDAG (t) ≥ k + 1, where t = bin (p, q)
or t = priv (p) and sizeDAG (p) ≤ k and sizeDAG (q) ≤ k, statement
δ (tσ) = tδ (σ) is still true. We have:
– either t = bin (p, q). As δ (bin (p, q)σ) = δ (bin (pσ, qσ)) =
bin (δ (pσ) , δ (qσ)) = bin (pδ (σ) , qδ (σ)) = bin (p, q) δ (σ).
– or t = priv (p). In this case the proof can be done by analogy with
previous one.
Remark: as S is standard, t 6= · (L).
Theorem 3. Given a standard constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n and
its normalized model σ in DY+ACI. Then δ (σ) is a model in DY of S.
Proof. Let E B t be any element of S. As σ is a model of S, then ptσq ∈
Der (pEσq). As σ is normalized and S is standard, using Lemma 20 we have
ptσq = tσ and pEσq = Eσ. Then, tσ ∈ Der (Eσ). That means, there exists
a DY+ACI derivation D = {A0, . . . , Ak} such that A0 = Eσ and tσ ∈ Ak.
By Lemma 21 and Lemma 3 (which also works for DY case) we can easily
prove that if k > 0, δ (Aj) ⊆ DerDY (δ (Aj−1)) , j = 1, . . . , k. Note, that
δ (A) is a set of standard terms (and thus, normalized) for any set of terms
A. Then, applying transitivity of DerDY (·) (Lemma 2 for DY) k times, we
have that δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)). In the case where k = 0, the statement
δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)) is also true.
Using Proposition 14 we have that δ (A0) = δ (Eσ) = Eδ (σ), as E ⊆
QSub (S). The same for t: δ (tσ) = tδ (σ), and as tσ ∈ Ak, we have tδ (σ) ∈
δ (Ak).
44
Thus, we have that tδ (σ) ∈ δ (Ak) ⊆ DerDY (δ (A0)) = DerDY (Eδ (σ)),
that means δ (σ) DY-satisfies any constraint of S.
We present an example illustrating the theorem.
Example 8. Let us consider a standard constraint system similar to one in
Example 5.
S =
{
enc (x, a) , pair (c, a) B b
pair (x, c) B a
}
,
Using Algorithm 2, we can get a model of S within DY+ACI, let’s say, as in
Example 6, σ = {x 7→ · ({a, b, c})}.
Then, by applying transformation δ (·), we will get σ′ = δ (σ) =
{x 7→ pair (a, pair (b, c))}. We can see, that σ′ is also a model of S within
DY(as it was proven in Theorem 3).
Corollary 3 (of Theorem 3 and Proposition 13). A standard constraint
system S is satisfiable within DY iff it is satisfiable within DY+ACI.
Corollary 4. Satisfiability of constraint system within DY is in NP .
6. Conclusions
In this work we presented a decision algorithm of satisfiability of general
constraint system within Dolev-Yao deduction system as well as one extended
with ACI symbol that can be used to represent sets of terms. The complexity
class of the algorithm was proved to be in NP -complete.
We have given also two applications of the presented result: protocol
insecurity with non-communicating intruders and discovering XML-based
attacks.
APPENDIX
Appendix A. General constraints for subterm theories
• composition rules: for all public functional symbols f , x1, . . . , xk →
f(x1, . . . , xk)
• decomposition rules: t1, . . . , tm → s, where s is a subterm of ti for some
i.
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We show that the satisfiability of constraint system within subterm de-
duction system is undecidable in general. More precisely:
Instance: a subterm deduction system D, a constraint system C.
Question: is C satisfiable ?
To show this, we reduce the halting problem of a Deterministic Turing
Machine (TM) M that works on a single tape. We consider the tape alphabet
Γ = {0, 1, [}, and [ is the blank symbol. The states of the TM M are in a
finite set Q = {q1, q2, . . . , qn}. W.l.o.g. we can assume that q1 (resp. qn) is
the unique initial (resp. accepting) state.
In order to represent Turing machine configuration as terms we shall
introduce a set of variables X and an alphabet F
F := {0, 1, [,⊥} ∪Q,
where F \ {⊥} are public functional symbols.
The TM configuration with tape ⊥ abcde ⊥, (where ⊥ is an endmarker),
with symbol d under the head, and state q will be represented by the following
term of q(c(b(a(⊥), d(e(⊥), x) where x ∈ X and a, b, c, d, e ∈ {0, 1, [}.
The composition rules we consider for the TM are u → f(u) for each
f ∈ {0, 1, [} and u, v, w → q(u, v, w) for each q ∈ Q. For each TM transition of
M we will introduce some decomposition deduction rule that can be applied on
a term representation q(u, v, q′(u′, v′, x′)) iff the transition can be applied to a
configuration represented by q(u, v, ) and generate a configuration represented
by q′(u′, v′, ). For each TM instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to
state q′ and write b”, we define the following rule for a, b ∈ {0, 1, [}:
q(u, a(v), q′(u, b(v), x))→ q′(u, b(v), x)
For each instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and move
right”, we define the following rules for a ∈ {0, 1, [} :
q(u, a(v), q′(a(u), v, x))→ q′(a(u), v, x)
A rule is for extending the tape on the right when needed:
q(u,⊥, q′([(u),⊥, x))→ q′([(u),⊥, x)
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For each instruction of type: “In state q reading a go to state q′ and move
left”, we define the following rules for a ∈ {0, 1, [} :
q(a(u), v, q′(u, a(v), x))→ q′(u, a(v), x)
A rule is for extending the tape on the left when needed:
q(⊥, a(v), q′(⊥, [(a(v)), x))→ q′(⊥, [(a(v)), x)
The resulting deduction system DM is obviously a subterm deduction
system.
Let us consider a constraint S to be solved modulo DM :
{q1(⊥,⊥, x)}B qn(y, z, w)
This constraint is satisfiable iff there is a sequence of transitions of M
from a configuration with initial state q1 and empty tape to a configuration
with an accepting state. Hence the constraint solving problem is undecidable.
Let us recall the definition of some properties of constraint systems. These
two properties are natural for modeling standard security protocols:
variable origination: ∀i, ∀x ∈ Vars (Ei) ∃j < i x ∈ Vars (tj),
monotonicity: j < i =⇒ Ej ⊆ Ei.
Note that {{q1(⊥,⊥, x)}B qn(y, z, w)} is obviously monotonic.
As a consequence, satisfiability of monotonic constraint systems (but
without variable origination) is undecidable. Here is another constraint
system, where variable origination is satisfied, but monotony is not. It can
be used for reducing the halting problem again:
{{⊥}B x, {q1(⊥,⊥, x)}B qn(y, z, w)}
As a consequence, satisfiability of constraint systems with variable origi-
nation (but without monotonicity) is undecidable.
We should note by contrast (see [13]), that constraint solving in subterm
convergent theories is decidable if the constraint system S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n
satisfies both variable origination and monotonicity.
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Appendix B. Proofs
Appendix B.1. Proofs of several statements of Lemma 4
Statement 1: Follows from the definition of the normalization function and
Definition 3.4.
Statement 3: By induction on sizeDAG (s). Let us fix t.
• sizeDAG (s) = sizeDAG (ptq). Then s = ptq and psq = pptqq, and
from Statement 2 (by taking empty σ) we have ptq = pptqq, and
thus psq = s.
• Suppose, that for some k, for any s ∈ QSub (ptq), such that
sizeDAG (s) > k, s = psq.
• Consider case, where s ∈ QSub (ptq) and sizeDAG (s) = k. Then,
by definition of QSub (·), s is in
– priv (s) ∈ QSub (ptq). By induction supposition we have
ppriv (s)q = priv (s), and as ppriv (s)q = priv (psq), we have
s = psq.
– bin (s, p) ∈ QSub (ptq). By induction we have pbin (s, p)q =
bin (s, p), and as pbin (s, p)q = bin (psq , ppq), we have s =
psq.
– bin (p, s) ∈ QSub (ptq). The similar case.
– s ∈ elems (· (L)),· (L) ∈ QSub (ptq). As sizeDAG (· (L)) > k,
we have · (L) = p· (L)q, that means (from Definition 3.7), that
L is a list of normalized non-ACI-set terms, and as elems (L) ≈
L, we have that s is normalized.
Statement 4: Suppose the opposite and let us take s ∈ Sub (ptq) with
maximal sizeDAG (s) that does not satisfy the desired property. Note
that the “biggest” term in Sub (ptq), i.e. ptq, does satisfy the property,
as we can choose s′ = t ∈ Sub (t). By definition of Sub (·) if s ∈ Sub (ptq)
and s 6= ptq then there exists r ∈ Sub (ptq) such that
• r = bin (p, s) or r = bin (s, p) or r = priv (s). Without loss
of generality we consider only the first case (r = bin (p, s)) as
other ones are similar. As sizeDAG (r) > sizeDAG (s), there exists
r′ ∈ Sub (t) such that r = pr′q. By definition of p·q:
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– either r′ = bin (p′, s′) and pp′q = p and ps′q = s. As s′ ∈
Sub (r′) ⊆ Sub (t) the property is proved.
– or r′ = · (L) and pelems (L)q = {r}. Since for all q ∈ elems (L),
root (q) 6= ·, then there exists q ∈ elems (L) such that q =
bin (p′, s′) and pp′q = p and ps′q = s. Using Statement 17 we
have s′ ∈ Sub (t).
• r = · (L) and s ∈ L. Then, (since sizeDAG (r) > sizeDAG (s))
there exists r′ ∈ Sub (t) such that pr′q = r. Using Lemma re-
flemma:DAGvsQuasi and Statement 3 we obtain r — normalized,
and thus, root (s) 6= ·. Then by definition of p·q we have r′ = · (L′)
and L ≈ pelems (L′)q, and thus, s ∈ pelems (L′)q, that is there
exists s′ ∈ elems (L′) such that s = ps′q. Using again Statement 17
we have s′ ∈ Sub (t).
Statement 7: To get the first part of equality we first use Statement 5:
elems (p· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq)q) = pelems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq))q; then from
Definition 3.4 and Statement 5 we have that elems (· (pt1q , . . . , ptmq))
is a set of normalized terms. The second part directly follows from
Definition 3.4.
Statement 8: By induction on sizeDAG (t).
• sizeDAG (t) = 1, implies t = a ∈ A and then elems (a) = {a}, i.e.
the equality becomes trivial.
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k > 1), H (t) =⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p) holds.
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. We shold prove H (t) =⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
– t = priv (t1) or t = bin (p, q). In both cases, elems (t) = {t},
and thus, he equality is trivial.
– t = · (L). Note, that for all s ∈ L, sizeDAG (s) < k. Then,
on the one hand, H (· (L)) = ⋃p∈LH (p) = (by induction
supposition) =
⋃
p∈L
⋃
p′∈elems(p)H (p
′). On the other hand,⋃
p∈elems(·(L))H (p) =
⋃
p∈⋃p′∈L elems(p′)H (p) =⋃
p′∈L
⋃
p∈elems(p′)H (p). Thus, H (t) =
⋃
p∈elems(t)H (p).
Statement 10: This follows from Statements 9, 6, Definition 3.12 and from
equality pptqq = ptq (Statement 2).
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Statement 12: QSub (t) ⊆ QSub (QSub (t)) is trivial as t ∈ QSub (t). Now
we prove by induction on sizeDAG (t) that QSub (QSub (t)) ⊆ QSub (t)
• sizeDAG (t) = 1. Then t ∈ A∪X . As QSub (t) = {t} the statement
is trivial.
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k ≥ 1), the statement is
true.
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible
cases:
– t = bin (t1, t2). By definition QSub (t) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪
QSub (t2). Then, QSub (QSub (t)) = QSub (t)∪
QSub (QSub (t1))∪QSub (QSub (t2)) and, as sizeDAG (ti) < k
for i = 1, 2, by using induction supposition we obtain the
wanted property.
– t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
– t = · (L). Then QSub (t) = {t} ∪⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (p). And
QSub (QSub (t)) = QSub (t) ∪ ⋃p∈elems(L) QSub (QSub (p)),
but since sizeDAG (p) < k for such any p we can apply in-
duction supposition and get
⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (QSub (p)) =⋃
p∈elems(L) QSub (p) = QSub (t) \ {t}. Then
QSub (QSub (t)) = QSub (t) ∪ (QSub (t) \ {t}) = QSub (t).
Statement 15: By induction on sizeDAG (t)
• sizeDAG (t) = 1.
– t ∈ A. As tσ = t and Vars (t) = ∅, the statement becomes
trivial.
– t ∈ X . Then Sub (t)σ = tσ, Vars (t) = {t}; and as for any
term p, p ∈ Sub (p), we have Sub (tσ) = {tσ} ∪ Sub (tσ).
• Suppose, that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k ≥ 1), the statement is
true.
• Given a term t : sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1. Let us consider all possible
cases:
– t = bin (t1, t2). Then tσ = bin (t1σ, t2σ) and Vars (t) =
Vars (t1)∪Vars (t2). Sub (tσ) = {tσ}∪Sub (t1σ)∪Sub (t2σ) =
(as sizeDAG (ti) < k) = {tσ} ∪ Sub (t1)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t1)σ) ∪
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Sub (t2)σ∪Sub (Vars (t2)σ) = {tσ}∪Sub (t1)σ∪Sub (t2)σ∪
Sub ((Vars (t1) ∪ Vars (t2))σ) = Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
– t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
– t = · ({t1, . . . , tm}). We have tσ = · ({t1σ, . . . , tmσ}) and
Vars (t) =
⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti). Then we have Sub (tσ) = {tσ}∪⋃
i=1,...,m Sub (tiσ) = (as sizeDAG (ti) < k)
= {tσ} ∪ ⋃i=1,...,m (Sub (ti)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (ti)σ)) = {tσ} ∪⋃
i=1,...,m Sub (ti)σ ∪ Sub
((⋃
i=1,...,m Vars (ti)
)
σ
)
=
Sub (t)σ ∪ Sub (Vars (t)σ).
Statement 16: It follows from the fact that f(t) = ptq and gσ(t) = tσ are
deterministic functions, and thus return at most one value for one given
argument.
Statement 17: First we prove that elems (t) ⊆ QSub (t). We use induction
on sizeDAG (t).
• If root (t) 6= ·, then elems (t) = {t} ⊆ QSub (t). This case includes
all t such that sizeDAG (t) = 1. Thus we need to consider only
t = · (L).
• Suppose that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k ≥ 1), the statement
holds.
• If for some t we have sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1, then elems (t) =⋃
p∈L elems (p) and QSub (t) = {t}
⋃
p∈L QSub (p). And since
sizeDAG (p) < k using the induction supposition we obtain the
wanted statement.
Now we show that QSub (t) ⊆ Sub (t). Again, applying proof by
induction on on sizeDAG (t) we have:
• If sizeDAG (t) = 1, then QSub (t) = Sub (t) = {t}.
• Suppose that for any t : sizeDAG (t) < k (k ≥ 1), the statement
holds.
• If for some t we have sizeDAG (t) = k, k > 1, then
– t = bin (t1, t2).Then QSub (t) = {t} ∪ QSub (t1) ∪ QSub (t2)
and Sub (t) = {t} ∪ Sub (t1) ∪ Sub (t2),
where max{sizeDAG (t1) , sizeDAG (t2)} < k. And then using
induction supposition we can conclude for this case.
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– t = priv (t1). Proof is similar to one for the case above.
– t = · ({t1, . . . , tm}). Then we have
QSub (t) = {t} ∪⋃p∈elems({t1,...,tm}) QSub (p) ⊆ (using the al-
ready proved part of the property)
⊆ {t} ∪⋃p∈QSub({t1,...,tm}) QSub (p) = (as QSub (QSub (t)) =
QSub (t)) = {t}∪⋃p∈{t1,...,tm}QSub (p) ⊆ (by induction suppo-
sition, as sizeDAG (ti) < k for all i)⊆ {t}∪
⋃
p∈{t1,...,tm} Sub (p) =
Sub (t).
Statement 18: Using Statement 4 and the fact that p·q is a deterministic
function we obtain ∀p, q ∈ Sub (ptq) p 6= q ∃p′, q′ ∈ Sub (t) : p =
pp′q ∧ q = pq′q ∧ p 6= q. And thus, |Sub (ptq)| ≤ |Sub (t)|.
Statement 19: We have QSub (· ({t1, . . . , tl})) = {· ({t1, . . . , tl})}∪⋃l
i=1 QSub (elems (ti)). Using Statement 17 and 12 we have
QSub (elems (ti)) ⊆ QSub (QSub (ti)) = QSub (ti). Thus,
QSub (· ({t1, . . . , tl})) ⊆ {· ({t1, . . . , tl})} ∪QSub (t1) · · · ∪QSub (tl).
Appendix B.2. Proof of Property 11
As was stated before, the measure of the problem input is measure (S) =
n× sizeDAG (S) + |E (S)|, where S = {Ei B ti}i=1,...,n.
Algorithm 2 returns a normalized proof σ for decision problem if it exists.
Moreover, sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (S) for any x ∈ Vars (S).
First, we will normalize Sσ. From Lemma 18 follows, that we can do
it for the time Tpq ≤ Ppq(measure (Sσ)), where Ppq is some polynomial with
non-negative coefficients of some degree m′′ > 0.
From the Proposition 12 we will know that check of derivability of a
normalized ground term g from set of normalized ground terms G takes a
polynomial time depending on sizeDAG (G ∪ {g}). That is, there exists a
polynomial Pg with non-negative coefficients, such that number of operations
(execution time) to verify the derivability (g from G) will be limited by
Pg(sizeDAG (G ∪ {g})). Then the execution time for checking a set of ground
constraints {Gi B gi}i=1,...,n will be limited by
∑n
i=1 Pg(sizeDAG (Gi ∪ {gi})).
To show that the algorithm is in NP we need to show, that execution
time of check is polynomial limited by measure of algorithm’s input, i.e. there
exists a polynomial P , such that execution time does not exceed O(P (n×
sizeDAG (S) + |E (S)|)) steps.
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In our case, execution time T of a check will be T = Tpq + Tg, where Tg is
a time needed for checking ground derivability of Sσ: Tg ≤∑n
i=1 Pg(sizeDAG (p(Ei ∪ {ti})σq)). As Pg is a polynomial, let us say, of
degree m′ > 0, with non-negative coefficients, we can use the fact, that for
any positive integers x1, . . . , xk we have
∑k
i=1 Pg(xi) ≤ Pg(
∑k
i=1 xi). Then
we have Tg ≤ Pg(
∑n
i=1 sizeDAG (p(Ei ∪ {ti})σq)) and by Statement 18 of
Lemma 4 we have Tg ≤ Pg(
∑n
i=1 sizeDAG ((Ei ∪ {ti})σ)); using the same
lemma, we have
Tg ≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(
sizeDAG (Ei ∪ {ti}) + sizeDAG
(⋃
x
xσ
)))
≤
≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(
sizeDAG (Ei) + sizeDAG (ti) +
∑
x
sizeDAG (xσ)
))
≤
≤ Pg
(
n∑
i=1
(2 sizeDAG (S)) + n×
∑
x
(sizeDAG (xσ))
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
2× n× sizeDAG (S) + n×
∑
x
(2× sizeDAG (S))
)
≤
≤ Pg
(
2× n× sizeDAG (S) + 2× n× (sizeDAG (S))2
) ≤
≤ Pg
(
4× n× (sizeDAG (S))2
) ≤ Pg (4× (n× sizeDAG (S) + |E (S)|)2) =
= O
(
(measure (S))2m′
)
.
On the other hand, let us consider Tpq.
We have Tpq ≤ Ppq(n × sizeDAG (Sσ) + |E (Sσ)|). One can see that the
number of edges in DAG-representation of Sσ (where every variable x of S is
replaced by xσ) will not exceed the number of edges in S plus the number
of edges of all xσ: |E (Sσ)| ≤ |E (S)| +∑x∈Vars(S)|E (xσ)|. And since σ is
normalized, we can use Lemma 17: Tpq ≤ Ppq(n × sizeDAG (Sσ) + |E (S)| +∑
x∈Vars(S)(sizeDAG (xσ))
2).
Then, using Lemma 4 (Statement 15) we obtain Sub (Sσ) = Sub (S)σ ∪
Sub (Vars (S)σ), and thus, sizeDAG (Sσ) ≤ |Sub (S)σ|+
∑
x∈Vars(S) sizeDAG (xσ).
From Statement 16 of Lemma 4 follows that |Sub (S)σ| ≤ sizeDAG (S).
Since sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2 × sizeDAG (S) and |Vars (S)| ≤ sizeDAG (S), we ob-
tain sizeDAG (Sσ) ≤ sizeDAG (S) + 2 × (sizeDAG (S))2. In the same way,∑
x∈Vars(S)(sizeDAG (xσ))
2 ≤ sizeDAG (S)× (2× sizeDAG (S))2.
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Therefore, Tpq ≤ Ppq(n × (sizeDAG (S) + 2 × (sizeDAG (S))2) + |E (S)| +
sizeDAG (S)× (2× sizeDAG (S))2) = O
(
(measure (S))3m′′).
Thus, T = O
(
(measure (S))3m′′ + (measure (S))2m′
)
that shows, that a
test of a proof returned by the algorithm takes polynomial time what gives
us a class of complexity.
Appendix B.3. Proof of Lemma 12
Let us consider all the cases of DY+ACI rules:
• t1, t2 → ppair (t1, t2)q We have two cases:
– ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then we have
pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) = pi(H (pair (pt1q , pt2q))) =
pi({pair (pi(H (pt1q)), pi(H (pt2q)))}) =
ppair (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2)))q and then pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈
Der ({pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))}).
– @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then (by defini-
tion, Lemma 4 and Proposition 1) pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) =
pi(H (pt1q)∪H (pt2q)) ∈ Der (pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q). By Proposition 1,
pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (t1))}) and pH (t2)q ⊆
Der ({pi(H (t2))}), then by Lemma 3, pH (t1)q ∪ pH (t2)q
⊆ Der ({pi(H (t1))} ∪ {pi(H (t2))}). Now, by applying Lemma 2,
we have pi(H (ppair (t1, t2)q)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (t1))} ∪ {pi(H (t2))}).
So, in this case pi(H (r)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (l1)), pi(H (l2))}).
• t1, t2 → penc (t1, t2)q. Proof of this case can be done by analogy of
previous one.
• {t1, t2} → paenc (t1, t2)q. The same.
• t1, priv (t2)→ psig (t1, priv (t2))q.
– ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that psig (t1, priv (t2))q = puσq. Then
pi(H (psig (t1, priv (t2))q)) = pi(H (sig (t1, priv (t2)))) =
pi({sig (pi(H (pt1q)), pi(H (ppriv (t2)q)))}) =
psig (pi(H (t1)), priv (pi(H (t2))))q and then
pi(H (psig (t1, priv (t2))q)) ∈ Der ({pi(H (t1)), pi(H (priv (t2)))})
(as pi(H (priv (t2))) = priv (pi(H (t2)))).
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– @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that psig (t1, priv (t2))q = puσq. This case
can be proved in similar way as done for {t1, t2} → ppair (t1, t2)q.
• t1, . . . , tm → p· (t1, . . . , tm)q. On one hand, pi(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) =
pi(H (· (t1, . . . , tm))) = pi(H (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)) ∈
Der (pH (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)q). On the other hand, pH (ti)q ⊆
Der ({pi(H (ti))}). And thus, by Lemma 3, pi(H (p· (t1, . . . , tm)q)) ∈
Der ({pi(H (t1)), . . . , pi(H (tm))}).
• enc (t1, t2) , pt2q → pt1q. Here we have to show that pi(H (pt1q)) is
derivable from {pi(H (enc (t1, t2))), pi(H (pt2q))}. Consider two cases:
– ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (enc (t1, t2))) = enc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))), and pi(H (pt1q)) =
pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der ({enc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) , ppi(H (pt2q))q}).
– @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that penc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (enc (t1, t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪ H (t2)). Using Proposition 1, we
have pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (enc (t1, t2)))}), thus
(by Lemma 4) pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (enc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by
Proposition 1 we have that pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore,
by Lemma 2, we have
pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pi(H (enc (t1, t2)))).
• aenc (t1, t2) , ppriv (t2)q→ pt1q. Here we have to show that pi(H (pt1q))
is derivable from {pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))), pi(H (ppriv (t2)q))}. Consider two
cases:
– ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = aenc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))),
and then pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈
Der ({aenc (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) , ppriv (pi(H (t2)))q}).
On the other hand, pi(H (ppriv (t2)q)) = pi(H (priv (t2))) =
pi({priv (pi(H (t2)))}) = ppriv (pi(H (t2)))q.
– @u ∈ QSub (S) such that paenc (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (aenc (t1, t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪ H (t2)). Using Proposition 1,
we have pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}), thus (by
Lemma 4) pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))}). And then, by
Proposition 1 we have that pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore,
by Lemma 2, pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pi(H (aenc (t1, t2)))).
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• pair (t1, t2)→ pt1q. Here, as usual, we consider two cases:
– ∃u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (pair (t1, t2))) = pair (pi(H (t1)), pi(H (t2))) and then
pi(H (pt1q)) = ppi(H (t1))q ∈ Der ({pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))}).
– @u ∈ QS˚ub (S) such that ppair (t1, t2)q = puσq. Then
pi(H (pair (t1, t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪ H (t2)). Then by Proposition 1,
we have pH (t1) ∪H (t2)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))}), thus
pH (t1)q ⊆ Der ({pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))}). And then, by Proposition 1
we have that pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pH (t1)q). Therefore, by Lemma 2,
pi(H (pt1q)) = pi(H (t1)) ∈ Der (pi(H (pair (t1, t2)))).
• pair (t1, t2)→ pt2q. Proof like above.
• · (t1, . . . , tm) → ptiq. We have pi(H (· (t1, . . . , t2))) = pi(H (t1) ∪ · · · ∪
H (tm)). Then by Proposition 1, pH (t1) ∪ · · · ∪H (tm)q ⊆
Der (pi(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))); thus pH (ti)q ⊆ Der (pi(H (· (t1, . . . , tm)))).
As pi(H (ti)) ∈ Der (pH (ti)q), by Lemma 2 we have pi(H (ptiq)) =
pi(H (ti)) ∈ Der (pi(H (· (t1, . . . , t2)))).
As all possible cases satisfy lemma conditions, we proved the lemma.
Appendix B.4. Proof of Property 8
Proof. From proposition 2 and 3 we know that if σ′ is a model of S then pσ′q
is a model of S and pσ′q is a model of pSq. Then, there exists a substitution
θ : dom (θ) = dom (pσ′q) , dom (θ) θ ⊆ dom (θ) , σ′′ = pσ′q |dom(θ)θ and σ′′ is
a model of pSq θ such that xσ′′ 6= yσ′′, if x 6= y (this is true because we
can show how to build θ : given the pσ′q — simply split dom (pσ′q) into
the classes of equivalence modulo pσ′q, i.e. x ≡ y ⇐⇒ x pσ′q = y pσ′q; for
every class choose one representative [x]≡, and then xθ = [x]≡). Note, that
θσ′′ = σ′, that’s why σ′′ is a model of pSq θ.
Then, as σ′′ is a model of pSq θ, using Proposition 2, we can say that
σ′′ is a model of ppSq θq. Moreover, σ′′ is normalized and xσ′′ 6= yσ′′ for
all x, y ∈ dom (σ′′) such that x 6= y. Then, we can apply Corollary 1,
which gives us existence of conservative model δ of ppSq θq. That is why
we can apply Proposition 7: for any x ∈ Vars (ppSq θq), sizeDAG (xδ) ≤
2× sizeDAG (ppSq θq).
Note, that using Proposition 2, Lemma 16 and definition of “model”, we
can easily show that δ[θ] is a model of pSq. Moreover, δ[θ] is normalized.
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By definition of δ[θ] we can say, that for all x ∈ dom (δ[θ]) there exists
y ∈ dom (θ) θ such that xδ[θ] = yδ; and as y ∈ X (by definition of θ), then
sizeDAG (xδ[θ]) = sizeDAG (yδ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (ppSq θq) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq θ).
Applying Lemma 15, we have sizeDAG (xδ[θ]) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq).
Summing up, we have a normalized model σ = δ[θ] of pSq such that for
all x ∈ dom (σ), sizeDAG (xσ) ≤ 2× sizeDAG (pSq).
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